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INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals have caused many corporate law scholars
to re-evaluate a great deal of corporate law orthodoxy. In a recent essay,
Michael Klausner highlighted the limits of corporate law in promoting
good corporate governance and called for scholars to devote greater
attention to extralegal enforcement mechanisms. 1 A great many
scholars have already taken up that effort. Some have pursued the
insights offered by behavioral economics to aid their rethinking of the
last quarter century’s corporate law jurisprudence and commentary. 2
Many have focused their attention on the functioning of the securities
markets and the various players who comprise it. 3 Jill Fisch, Hillary
Sale, and John Coffee, among others, have emphasized the role of
gatekeepers such as securities analysts, securities lawyers, and auditors. 4
A great deal of this work has focused on the conflicts of interest
afflicting various actors and ways to deal with these conflicts. 5 An
article by Bernard Black emphasizes the importance of accurate, honest
1. Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Corporate
Governance, in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 91, 97-8 (Jay W. Lorsch,
Leslie Berlowitz & Andy Zelleke eds., 2005). Klausner explains the shortcomings of
corporate law and calls for attention to be paid to extra-legal influences on governance.
He notes that professional norms are “fostered by the financial press every time they
write a story that exposes bad board behavior . . . .” Id.
2. See generally Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP.
L. 715 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets:
A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Robert
Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding
Proposals for its Future, 51 Duke L.J. 1397 (2002); A. Michelle Dickerson, A
Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1
(2003).
3. See generally Robert J. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Regulation as
Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003).
4. See Jill. E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst As Agent:
Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040-56 (2003); see
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid,” 57 Bus. L.J. 1403 (2002) (hereinafter Coffee, Understanding Enron).
5. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 4, at 301; Coffee, Understanding
Enron, supra note 4, at 1403; Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1035.
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disclosure and how to ensure its quality. 6 Indeed, disclosure goes to the
very heart of any market-based extralegal enforcement apparatus in
corporate governance.
This Article pursues the important theme of disclosure, but focuses
on a feature that has remained almost entirely overlooked by corporate
and securities law scholars: the role of financial journalists in corporate
governance. 7 This omission is perhaps due to the fact that journalists do
not fit easily into a legal discussion because they are largely unregulated.
They are, in a sense, not legal actors, and, therefore do not comfortably
become the subject of a legal prescription. Nevertheless, journalists
contribute in many ways to the legal system at large and the system of
corporate governance in particular.
This Article uses case studies to highlight the importance of
financial journalists in our scheme of corporate law by identifying and
illustrating several distinct ways that journalists contribute to our system
of corporate governance. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully
explain the mechanisms whereby journalistic reporting affects attitudes
and actions, whether on the part of the public at large, legislators,
judges, prosecutors or corporate directors and officers. 8 Nonetheless,
the case studies suggest causal links between the reporting described and
the consequences for corporate governance that follow. Rather than
attempting to undertake a thoroughgoing empirical exploration of the
6. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001).
7. Despite ubiquitous references to media reports throughout corporate law
scholarship, no one has written a thorough account of the role of the media in corporate
law. Scholars have, however, paid some attention to the media in other areas of law.
See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the Media,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091 (2004) (discussing the media’s role in the legislative process
that ultimately led to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005); M. ETHAN KATSH, LAW IN A DIGITAL WORLD 9 (1995)
“Scholars seem to view the powerful realms of law and media as distinct and
independent, each having an impact on behavior and attitudes, but having little
influence on each other.” (pointing out that books about communication and society
rarely focus on law, while books about law focus on speech regulation and free
expression, but little else); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & PAUL WALDMAN, THE PRESS
EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS AND THE STORIES THAT SHAPE THE POLITICAL
WORLD 95-97 (2003) (explaining the ways that the press shapes events in the political
sphere).
8. See Daniel M. Filler, From Law to Content in the New Media Marketplace, 90
CAL. L. REV 1739, 1756 n.80 (2002) (noting that “there has been a remarkable paucity
of scholarship on the links between media coverage and the law”). Id.
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track record of financial journalists’ contributions to corporate
governance, this Article presents an overview that surveys the terrain,
setting out markers for future empirical, theoretical, and doctrinal
inquiry. In so doing, this Article creates a research agenda for scholars
who wish to pursue the issues explored herein more rigorously, in order
to deepen our understanding of the way journalists affect corporate
governance.
Part I reviews the structure of corporate law in order to demonstrate
where journalists fit in. Part II contextualizes the role of journalists in
corporate law by addressing several preliminary issues: the sorts of roles
they are not well suited to fill, the incentives under which they operate,
how they get their information and the relationship between shaming
and my view of journalistic enforcement. Part III explores the numerous
roles that journalists can and do fill in the corporate governance system. 9
Among these are uncovering and deterring fraud, and acting as an
informational intermediary that catalyzes and informs legal action by
Congress, the SEC, the courts, shareholders, or private litigants. 10
Along the way I will highlight the conflicts of interest that afflict
virtually every actor in the system of corporate governance, and argue
that financial journalists enjoy a convergence of their public and selfinterests, and thus can help to bring these other actors’ conflicting
interests into alignment.
One possible objection to a theory of journalistic enforcement of
corporate law is that securities analysts are in a better position than
journalists to ferret out financial fraud. In Part IV, I consider the role of
analysts—their competencies and conflicts—and compare them to those
of journalists. This comparison does not yield an easy answer as to
which set of professionals serve as the better enforcer. Rather, the
comparison serves as a basis for reflecting on the ways journalists and
analysts might interact to improve the overall efficiency of the corporate
system.
In its brief discussion of gatekeepers, this Article will limit its focus
to securities analysts: the gatekeepers whose function most closely
9.
10.

See infra Part III.
In addition to performing these roles vis-à-vis corporate managers, they can do
the same for the gatekeepers of corporate America—those professionals relied on by
corporate and securities law to monitor and advise corporate actors. Corporate and
securities law scholars have paid considerable attention to the role of gatekeepers in
recent years. See Black supra note 6, at 781. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the
ways that financial journalists report on gatekeepers is beyond the scope of this Article.
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overlaps with that of journalists. Journalists can cover gatekeepers in
either an adversarial role, by reporting wrongdoing, 11 or in a cooperative
dynamic, by complementing the research conducted by securities
analysts, who may choose not to publicize the wrongdoing they uncover
because of their own conflicts. 12
I. FILLING A GAP IN CORPORATE LAW: WHERE DO JOURNALISTS FIT INTO
OUR SCHEME OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
A. How Corporate Law Works.
The central task of corporate law is to reduce the loss in shareholder
wealth that inevitably results from the central feature of the modern
American corporation—the separation of ownership and management. 13
Shareholders (the principals) own the company, but managers and
directors (their agents) are responsible for directing its affairs. A
necessary result of this separation of ownership and control is that
managers’ interests are different from those of shareholders. While
shareholders want the firm to be as profitable as possible, managers
want to be well compensated, and avoid working too hard while
retaining their lucrative, prestigious and powerful positions.
Corporate directors and officers are conflicted. They are dutybound to act in the interest of shareholders, but have personal interests
as well. Their fiduciary duty requires them to work diligently and
loyalty on behalf of the shareholders, but as human beings they face the
imperative of satisfying their own interests. Sometimes they do not
work hard enough; sometimes they are not honest enough. They
appropriate corporate assets to themselves; they falsify financial
disclosures. Sometimes they harm shareholders by engaging in
wrongful market conduct. Corporate law seeks to align their interests
with those of the shareholders. It succeeds to a greater or lesser extent.
Corporate law has developed several mechanisms to minimize the
11. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, How Did They Value Stocks? Count the Absurd
Ways, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001 at C1. Gretchen Morgenson of the New York Times
received a Pulitzer Prize in 2002 for her coverage of the conflicts of interest that led
analysts to continue to publicly hype stocks while privately deriding them as “junk” or
worse.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See generally ADOLPH BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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agency costs that arise as a result of the separation of ownership and
control. First, if managers do a poor job, shareholders may use the
franchise to remove directors from office. Second, they may sue the
directors to rectify wrongful behavior. These are the two primary legal
tools available to shareholders. For reasons that have been ably
explained by many others, these legal restraints are relatively weak. 14
Beyond the mainly ineffectual derivative actions and electoral
mechanisms, two other constraints intimately related to capital markets
are believed to exert a more meaningful form of constraint on managers.
The disclosure regime imposed by federal securities law, and the market
for corporate control, have functioned as more effective disciplinary
structures. 15 The market for corporate control improves managerial
honesty and diligence because it plays on directors’ and mangers’
interest in keeping their jobs and maintaining control of their
corporations. Lastly, federal securities laws require the detailed
disclosure that is the lifeblood of our capital markets, and is the
informational predicate that the market for corporate control relies on to
signal management underperformance. Accurate, timely disclosure of
company financial information is vital to the operation of both
mechanisms, and it is notable that the most infamous scandals of recent
years have involved the falsifying of financial disclosure.
These four basic mechanisms of managerial discipline form the
backbone of the American corporate governance system. But they are
not the only explanations for the relative efficiency of our corporate
system. Even with these legal and market mechanisms in place, there
remains ample opportunity for corporate managers to appropriate
shareholder wealth to themselves, either through excessive
compensation in cash or perquisites, improper loans and other selfdealing, or by otherwise underperforming and shirking. Individual
managers stand to reap enormous personal financial rewards through
fraud or other misbehavior that poses little threat of discovery. The
standard legal and market constraints represent a rational and largely
14. See, e.g., LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE, 207-210, (2004) (explaining the weaknesses in the system of
shareholder voting, its negligible frequency and SEC proposals to strengthen it); Id. at
45-48 (explaining both the procedural hurdles and substantive rules of law that inhibit
shareholders from successfully pursuing claims against managers and directors in
derivative actions); Klausner, supra note 1, at 92-93 (explaining the general weakness
of shareholder voting and derivative actions as disciplinary mechanisms).
15. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 3, at 859.
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effective response to this problem, but deterrence is imperfect and
temptation is enormous. Corporate law is thus faced with a chronic
problem of enforcement: how to make managers follow the rules
furnished by our legal system?
Recently, American corporations have been the scene of some
shockingly bald examples of corporate managers acting primarily in
their own self interest, to the great financial detriment of their
shareholders. It seems as though the disciplinary effect of state
corporate law, federal securities law, and extra-legal enforcement
mechanisms, has failed to fully align management’s interests with those
of shareholders.
In an attempt to impose further discipline on corporate leaders,
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 16 The Act imposed
numerous duties on various corporate actors; not only on directors and
officers, 17 but also on the professional gatekeepers who lend their
expertise to the corporate endeavor: auditors who bear the responsibility
of assuring that corporations provide fair and accurate financial
information to the public that fairly and accurately reflects the reality of
the corporation’s financial status, 18 attorneys who advise corporations
on their transactions and securities issuances, 19 and securities analysts
who serve the dual role of informational intermediary and marketing
cheerleader. 20
While many have criticized the wisdom of several provisions of
Sarbanes-Oxley on their merits, 21 the Act suffers from another frailty

16. Officially titled the “Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002.” Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter the
“Sarbanes-Oxley Act,” “Sarbanes-Oxley,” or the “Act”].
17. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2002) (requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify the
“appropriateness of the financial statements and disclosures contained in the periodic
report, and that those financial statements and disclosures fairly present, in all material
respects, the operations and financial conditions of the issuer”).
18. Title I of the Act establishes the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2002).
19. Section 307 directs the SEC to establish rules governing the professional
responsibility of attorneys advising public corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002)
20. Section 501 directs the SEC to establish rules governing securities analysts. 15
U.S.C. 780-86 (2002).
21. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005); Larry Ribstein, Market vs.
Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
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common to all areas of corporate law, and, indeed to all legal regulation:
the aforementioned problem of enforcement. Even if all were to agree
that the rules and standards contained in the Act were perfectly
conceived and drafted, the problem will remain: how to get corporate
managers to obey the rules, and adhere to these standards.
Several potential solutions to this problem suggest themselves. We
might simply hope that those individuals charged with duties and
responsibilities under the Act, and corporate law generally, will
faithfully discharge them because it is the right thing to do, but such a
posture is clearly naïve. We might believe that traditional enforcement
will be enough to ensure compliance with legal norms. We might hope
that Congress, having charged the Securities and Exchange Commission
with responsibility for enforcing the rules, will provide sufficient
funding to vigorously police corporate managers and enforce the law.
Another possibility is that internal pressure, i.e., a corporate culture
of adherence to the law, might make all corporate employees into the
enforcing arm of these various regulatory schemes. Under such a view,
well-intentioned corporate employees, privy to corporate activities but
typically reluctant to make waves, will be relied on to smoke out
malfeasance and do something about it.
This approach, like all corporate law, is impeded by the problem of
interest. Corporations are made up of individuals, each with his or her
own conflict of interest. Perhaps it is not too naïve to proceed from the
premise that most people are basically virtuous, and wish to do the right
thing, 22 but are just conflicted. These individuals have both self-interest
and a public-minded interest. They wish to be good, law-abiding
citizens, and probably want to call attention to the wrongdoing they see
around them. However, they also have a self-interest, albeit benign, in
keeping their jobs. Imagine a scenario in which a mid-level manager, or
even someone further down the corporate hierarchy, becomes aware of
financial wrongdoing at the highest level. That person might want to
alert upper management to the illicit behavior of their supervisors.
Obviously this poses a problem. No good deed goes unpunished: they
2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (2002).
22. For a notable adherent to this viewpoint, see ADAM SMITH, The Theory of
Moral Sentiments in THE ESSENTIAL ADAM SMITH 65 (R. L. Heilbroner ed., W. W.
Norton & Co. 1986). “How selfish soever men may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature which interest him in the fortune of others, and render
their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure
of seeking it.” Id.
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may lose their job as thanks for their efforts. So these individuals suffer
from a conflict of interest—one that reduces the overall efficacy of
enforcement efforts. 23
B. Reputational Constraints.
Beyond Sarbanes-Oxley and the four legal mechanisms described
above, what else accounts for the fact that by and large directors and
officers do a pretty good job? One strand of corporate theory propounds
the view that reputational concerns account for this generally good
behavior. 24 While recognizing that the mechanisms of corporate law
only loosely constrain the opportunistic behavior of management, this
theory holds that directors refrain from appropriating corporate assets
because they know that if they overreach, share prices will fall, they may
be sued or challenged in a proxy fight, and thereby lose their stature
among peers. This is not a mere dignitary threat; more importantly, their
services will suffer in the market. They will be unable to secure other
board or executive positions.
Some corporate law scholars thus point to the desire of managers
and directors to reap the rewards of self-esteem, and positive reputation,
as a meaningful constraining force. 25 Indeed one commentator has
asserted, with perhaps a degree of hyperbole, that “corporate directors
are the ‘most reputationally sensitive people in the world.’” 26 Some
have explained this concern by reference to the reality that corporate
managers suffer from a lack of diversification, both in wealth and
personal labor. 27 That is, in contrast to shareholders who spread their
23. Whistleblower statues are one way that the law has responded to this problem
of interest. The law affords certain protections to those who seek to redress wrongs
done in the workplace, but these laws, while well-intentioned, are relatively ineffective
and significantly restricted in design and scope. See infra Part II.E.1.
24. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Management and
Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Executive Compensation and Takeovers:
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69
U. CHI. L. REV 751 (2001); Ribstein, supra note 21; David Skeel, Norms and Corporate
Law: Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001).
25. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1012-14 (1997).
26. Skeel, supra note 24, at 1859 (quoting shareholder activist David Monks).
27. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 4, at 301 (noting that “[m]anagers
generally make large, firm-specific human capital investments in their firms.”); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of Modern Business
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wealth throughout a diversified investment portfolio, an outsized
proportion of the personal wealth of executives of large public
corporations is invested in the company they run. 28 By the same token,
in contrast to the labor portfolios of gatekeepers such as accountants,
lawyers and analysts—who work for many different clients—corporate
executives are totally undiversified, investing all of their labor in the
corporation they run. 29 Executives thus have a great incentive to
maintain a reputation for honesty, diligence, competence and success.
But at the same time, they also have full access to the assets of their
corporation, and an enormous temptation to enrich themselves in
inappropriate ways.
In light of the view that reputational interests are an effective
constraint on management, we might begin with the following
suppositions. First, despite their concern for their reputations, managers
are evidently unwilling to forgo wrongful personal gain, where that gain
is the result of behavior shielded from public view, and thus unlikely to
be discovered and punished. Indeed, as the recent corporate scandals
have made clear, many managers will steal furtively. Focusing then on
opportunistic wrongdoers, we can assume that if managers are willing to
forgo wrongful gains if the likelihood of discovery is high, then
publicity in the form of journalistic reporting is key to pushing them
further still toward an ideal of managerial behavior. These premises
underlie the claim of this Article: that journalistic reporting can serve to
improve corporate governance.
C. Gatekeepers As a Constraint on Management.
Before discussing the ways that journalists go about their work, I
wish to note that a check on managerial opportunism can be found, to
some degree, in the system of gatekeepers our capital markets and
corporate governance scheme relies on. 30
Gatekeepers include

Corporations: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1253, 1245.
28. Stock ownership by managers is generally viewed as a good thing for corporate
governance. Share ownership by managers helps align their interests with those of the
public shareholders and increases their incentive to run their company profitably. See
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 14, at 2-4.
29. See Gordon supra note 27, at 1245.
30. See generally Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 4; Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
53 (1986).
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professionals such as securities lawyers, securities analysts, auditors and
debt rating agencies, professionals who play an important role in the
financial life of any corporation that seeks to avail itself of the capital
markets. These market intermediaries assist issuers in the preparation of
their public disclosures and the marketing of their securities to the
public. They also advise on the viability, profitability and legality of
many business decisions. In so doing, they serve to enhance managerial
effectiveness.
But gatekeepers also function to keep managers honest. As
previously mentioned, the temptation for corporate managers to
misrepresent material facts in SEC disclosure filings and elsewhere may
be enormous because of the large gains they stand to reap from such
malfeasance. One theoretical view of the incentive structure underlying
the effectiveness of the gatekeeper system can be understood by
reference to managers’ lack of labor and wealth diversification. 31
Whereas corporate executives invest all of their labor capital and
significant proportions of their financial capital in their company,
gatekeepers are well-diversified: they work for many different issuers
and gain only a small percentage of their income from any given
client. 32 Moreover, gatekeepers have a significant investment in their
own reputation for honesty and care. Since gatekeepers would receive
comparatively little benefit from condoning or committing fraud in
connection with any given client, the risk of impairing their reputation
and thus their ability to earn income from other clients is not worth
taking. 33 This view suggests that gatekeepers play a vital role in the
corporate governance system.
Yet, as recent experience has
demonstrated, this role has proven problematic; for reasons to be
explained later in this Article, gatekeepers are not completely effective
at preventing managers from engaging in inappropriate self-serving
conduct. 34 Part IV will briefly explore the failures of gatekeepers,
analysts in particular, and the conflicts of interest that have made such
failures nearly inevitable.
The next Part addresses several preliminary questions that will
provide some background necessary to understand Part III’s detailed
description of the particular roles financial journalists play in corporate

31.
32.
33.
34.

See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1245.
See generally Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 4.
Id.
See infra Part IV.
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governance. Among these questions is what kinds of wrongdoings can
journalists be counted on to uncover? How does this Article’s account
of journalistic enforcement of corporate law intersect with the theory of
shaming? How do journalists gather their information? Why should
journalists bother?
II. WHAT CAN WE EXPECT OF JOURNALISTS AND WHY?
A. Journalists Are Best Suited to Uncovering Affirmative Wrongdoing.
One key question to be answered in fashioning an account of
journalists’ role in corporate governance is: what kinds of transgressions
are financial journalists most likely to reveal? It is not realistic to
suppose that financial journalists will play an effective, leading edge
role in uncovering merely inefficient management. That role is best
carried out by analysts and institutional investors, and is reflected in
share price. But that is not to say that financial journalists do not report
on such matters. In fact, a great deal of financial journalism addresses
management and the daily performance of corporations in the
marketplace. But I place this sort of reporting outside the ambit of this
Article because it seems only loosely or diffusely connected to
governance. 35 Moreover, because of its ubiquity, uneven quality, and
frequent reliance on analysts for company talking points, I consider it to
be less consequential than other kinds of reporting, not to mention
altogether more difficult to measure. Rather, I will focus on journalistic
coverage of more active species of wrongdoing that are not the result of
laziness, poor decision-making or incompetence. This kind of behavior
often manifests itself as deceptive accounting practices, including the
exquisitely complex sort of special purpose entity financing employed
by Enron, 36 blatant falsification of accounting records, failures to
implement adequate internal controls, 37 intentionally misleading

35. This is not to minimize the importance of quotidian reporting on company
performance, management, strategy, finance and the like. By bringing to the investing
public such information about companies, financial journalism takes its rightful place
among the mechanisms of market efficiency. Indeed, such a role is recognized by the
law. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1986) (requiring,
under the disclose or abstain rule, insiders to disseminate their material nonpublic
information through the financial media).
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See infra Part III.C.
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forecasts of earnings, and criminal or otherwise wrongful market
conduct. 38
Beyond investigating and reporting on managerial malfeasance,
journalists also contribute to corporate governance through their
coverage of legislative initiatives affecting corporate governance and
securities regulation. This role has become more pronounced in the
wake of the federal government’s recently enlarged role since the
enactment of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Thus I will also explore the
ways in which journalists can contribute to the efficacy of federal
legislative and regulatory law in corporate governance. 39 This role
involves maintaining public awareness of corporate wrongdoing, and
also apprising the public of Congressional support of the SEC—the
body charged with enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley. The public
awareness engendered by effective reporting on the intersection of
corporate scandal and the legislative process in turn increases political
pressure on Congress to legislate for the common weal, rather than on
behalf of special interests.
B. Journalism Or Shaming?
In recent years, several corporate law scholars have turned their
attention to shaming and social norms. David Skeel has explained the
ways that enforcers such as judges, 40 institutional investors, 41 and socalled “shaming entrepreneurs” 42 have attempted to deter corporate
38.
39.
40.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.D.
See Skeel, supra note 24, at 1823-26, 1852 n.163 (noting that the U.S. Federal
Sentencing Guidelines authorize judges to “order [a corporate defendant], at its expense
. . . to publicize the nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, the nature of
the punishment imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the recurrence of
similar offenses”); see also Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without . . . : Some Critical
Reflections on the Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397,
430 (1993) (discussing the “punitive publicity” policy of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.
41. See Skeel, supra note 24, at 1836-42. For example, the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), a major institutional investor, annually
publishes a list of underperforming companies. The list outlines the managerial
missteps that have caused CalPERS to highlight the firm. The publicity and
embarrassment caused by a spot on the list has apparently been effective in inducing
positive changes in the targeted companies.
42. Id. at 1823. The most prominent example of shaming entrepreneurs is Robert
Monks and Nell Minow, two shareholder activists who have taken it upon themselves to
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malfeasance by invoking shaming sanctions. The financial press has
also engaged in shaming. Business Week and Fortune have in recent
years published articles listing the worst performing corporate boards.43
In discussing the role of journalists as enforcers of corporate governance
norms, I address the distinctions and areas of convergence between my
account and the theory of shaming put forward by Skeel and others. 44
There is a great degree of overlap between the two approaches, but
significant differences remain.
The most important distinction is that in shaming theory, shaming is
the enforcement. Except in the case of judicial shaming, the sanction is
purely extralegal. However, in my account of journalistic enforcement,
the role of the press is not necessarily to impose the ultimate sanction,
although I acknowledge the vitality of such a role. Rather, I will focus
primarily on the press as playing an intermediate role, somewhere
between the wrongdoers and institutional enforcement actors such as the
courts, plaintiffs’ firms, the SEC, Congress, and the capital markets. By
calling attention to the misdeeds of corporate directors and officers, the
press can initiate various sorts of corrective responses, whether judicial,
legislative, administrative, or market-imposed.
This is not to say that the theories are mutually exclusive or
independent of one another. For example, both theories depend on the
sensitivity of the transgressor to reputational concerns. This is an
important point because one of the functions of the press in enforcement
is its role as an alternative or supplement to legal enforcement. To a
degree, journalistic revelation of corporate malfeasance will in itself
reduce the incidence of wrongdoing. This is accomplished in two ways.
First, press coverage that brings to light a given instance of wrongdoing
may actually put a stop to it. Second, in an environment of heightened
take out full-page advertisements in national publications like the Wall Street Journal to
shame the directors of large, publicly-held corporations. One such advertisement
consisted of a full-page silhouette purporting to represent the directors of Sears
Roebuck along with the following text: “The Non-Performing Assets of Sears.” For
more discussion of the role of shaming entrepreneurs, see id. at 1823-26.
43. See John A. Byrne & Richard Melcher, The Best and Worst Boards, BUSINESS
WEEK, Nov. 25, 1996, at 82; Geoffrey Colvin, America’s Worst Boards, FORTUNE, Apr.
17, 2000, at 241.
44. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959 (1999); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming WhiteCollar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J. L.
& ECON. 365 (1999).
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and effective press coverage of fraud, would-be fraudsters will be
deterred by a heightened likelihood of discovery of their actual or
potential wrongdoing.
Another point of overlap is the sensitivity of each approach to the
type and degree of wrongdoing. Skeel makes clear that the virtues of
shaming are minimized in cases of mismanagement and maximized in
cases of affirmative wrongdoing or illegality. 45 Skeel has pointed out
that shaming is inappropriate in cases of mismanagement because it
over-deters risk-taking by imposing excessive costs for managers whose
wealth is not diversified. 46 The market for corporate control better
addresses the problem of ineffective management. Similarly, as Part III
demonstrates, financial journalists can contribute most to corporate
governance by reporting on affirmative wrongdoing, rather than simply
poor decision making.
C. Careerist Self-Interest As an Incentive for Energetic Reporting
Enlightened self-interest gives us reason to believe that financial
journalists can play an important role in improving corporate
governance. Whereas bad corporate governance can properly be seen as
stemming from the divergence of management’s self-interest and
shareholders’ interests, financial journalists actually enjoy a
convergence of their self-interest in career gains and the public’s interest
in managerial integrity and shareholder wealth maximization. Indeed,
journalists have more incentive than ever to perform this function.
A confluence of societal developments in the last twenty years has
made the media environment more fertile than ever for high profile
financial journalism. First, more Americans are investors in the stock
market than ever before. 47 As a result, Americans are paying more
attention to the goings-on in America’s boardrooms. Also, since the
advent of round-the-clock cable news, particularly the spectacular rise in
the popularity of cable financial news, media outlets are devoting more
resources to their coverage of corporate affairs. Moreover, due to the

45.
46.
47.

See Skeel, supra note 24, at 1832-33.
Id.
See James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature,
Provision and Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105 (1998);
Michael J. Borden, PSLRA, SLUSA, and Variable Annuities: Overlooked Side Effects of
a Potent Legislative Medicine, 55 MERCER L. REV. 681, 714 (2004).
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recent rise of what might be termed an American “equity culture,” 48 the
most popular cable television coverage of corporate news has taken on a
decidedly financial cast. Many of the most-watched financial news
personalities either have backgrounds as traders or analysts, or pose as
having such expertise. These changes have led to a significant increase
in public awareness of, and focus upon, the financial details of corporate
activity, as opposed to the marketing, employment or product market
coverage that had previously received primary attention.
In addition, while news consumption used to be limited primarily to
the morning paper and the six o’clock television news, the modern 24hour news cycle has changed patterns of news-watching behavior. The
resulting expansion of air time, and greater pot of money to be earned by
media professionals, has created a new careerism in journalism and a
culture of celebrity journalists. There is thus an unprecedented potential
for material and professional gain to be achieved by journalists who
cover important corporate news.
Corporate scandals have grown to such a level that they compete
with politics and sports for the attention of the popular mind. In this
environment, financial journalists have a heightened incentive to
investigate and publicize corporate wrongdoings. For example, Bethany
McLean, a reporter at Fortune, spent two years working on the Enron
story and finally reaped the reward of the notoriety that went along with
her reportorial accomplishment. Ms. McLean and her co-author signed
a publishing deal worth $1.4 million 49 for her book on Enron, 50 and the
book was then adapted into a successful documentary film. In addition,
she now frequently finds herself a commentator on national television. 51
Indeed in the current environment of media saturation, widespread
equity ownership, and rampant corporate fraud, financial journalists can
in fact do well by doing good.
D. Contrast with Political Journalists
This portrayal of financial journalists presents an interesting
48. Peter Nobel, Social Responsibility of Corporations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1255,
1255 (1999).
49. Eric Celeste, The Claim Game, DALLAS OBSERVER, Apr. 4, 2002.
50. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM 320
(2005).
51. McLean has appeared numerous times on The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, on
Court TV and elsewhere.
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contrast with political reporters who cover the President. Reporters who
cover the President are in a very vulnerable position. They are the elites
of the media, doing some of the most important, visible and
remunerative work of all journalists. But in order to fulfill their public
mission, they must ingratiate themselves with those who control access
to the highest governmental actors and information. If they are unable
to obtain such access, they will not only fail in their public duties, but
will also find their careers stalled. A shrewd administration can exploit
this conflict of interest by denying access to those reporters who publish
politically damaging stories. The result is the impoverishment of public
discourse on the actions of government.
Traditionally, administrations have been relatively inefficient in
guarding information and sealing the lips of top officials who have
access to it. But the George W. Bush administration has been
extraordinarily well disciplined in controlling information and access to
top officials. The Bush administration has been notably parsimonious in
its voluntary disclosure of information. Indeed one observer with a front
row seat to the press relations of the Bush II White House has recently
noted that it is “one of the most secretive White Houses ever.” 52
Furthermore, both the President and his two primary spokesmen, Ari
Fleischer (in the first G.W. Bush administration) and Scott McClelland
(in the second), have been draconian in their exploitation of political
reporters’ central conflict of interest. They have punished those who
have written damaging stories by denying them the access they need to
succeed professionally. This behavior began even before Bush took
office when, Bush commented at a campaign rally to Richard Cheney
that the New York Times’ Adam Clymer was “a major league
[expletive].” 53 The result of this antagonism has been to neuter the
White House press corps and impair the public’s understanding of
crucial policy decisions.
But this strategy of exploiting reporters’ dependence on information
works in the White House only because of a key structural feature of
that governmental institution. With strictly enforced codes of silence,
the White House has, for all intents and purposes, one sole gatekeeper of
information. The White House press secretary decides which reporters
52. Elisabeth Bumiller, The White House Without a Filter, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2006 at D3. The observations about information control in the Bush White House
pertain most accurately to the period from January 2001 to July 2006.
53. Adam Clymer, A Bush League Aside Vaults an Onlooker into the Campaign’s
Glare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at D1.
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will get their questions answered, or which will get interviews and other
access. 54
The gatekeeping function at the White House is
extraordinarily focused and efficient.
While reporting on the national political beat has no doubt been
diluted by the President’s media apparatus, this structural impediment to
the dissemination of information does not exist in the realm of financial
reporting. Whereas there is a single gatekeeper guarding the oval office,
Corporate America does not enjoy the same sort of fortress. Because
corporations are so numerous, and because any given major corporation
is spread out geographically, has numerous decision makers, and many
supporting actors with access to inside information, corporate
information has many points of egress. There is no gatekeeper in a large
corporation because there are so many employees and so little ability to
control their communication. Nor does the sense of missionary zeal
exist in a corporation as it does in the hallowed corridors of government.
Moreover, since the career aspirations of financial journalists are not
dependent on their ability to gain boardroom access, they are free of the
kinds of conflicts of interest that political reporters face.
Despite the existence of a fertile environment in which to ply their
trade, journalists cannot make stories happen on their own. Journalists,
in order to yoke their careerist self-interest to their public mission, must
rely on various techniques for developing information that is often
difficult to come by. The next Part briefly explores some of these
techniques.
E. How Do Financial Journalists Get Their Information?
1. Whistleblowers
A corporation may have scores of employees aware of its
misdoings and who are potential sources for news stories. But these
employees also suffer a conflict of interest. Frequently, they would like
to do the right thing, but are aware that in so doing they may lose their
jobs or their prospects for advancement. Other disincentives to report
wrongdoing are the personal stress that might result from reprisals, the
potential duty to serve as a witness in court, a sense that they are

54. Bob Edwards, The Press and Freedom: A Radio Journalist Spots Disturbing
Trends in How the White House Press Corps Reports on the Bush Administration,
NIEMAN REPORTS, Summer 2003, p. 81.
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betraying their colleagues, and perhaps uncertainty caused by
incomplete knowledge of the wrongdoing, particularly if the fraud is
well orchestrated and technically complex, as was the case in Enron. 55
While this conflict may constrain many corporate employees from
walking into the head office and demanding that wrongs be righted,
those employees may face much less risk by tipping off financial
reporters to the objectionable behavior of their superiors. Because they
are able to inform the media with a great deal of confidence in their
anonymity, these employees are able to act in the public interest without
harming their private interest in retaining their jobs.
While whistleblowers can perform a socially useful function, they
enjoy little protection from the law. Whistleblower protection statutes
take various forms and exist at both the state and federal level. 56 These
statutes mainly require disclosure to governmental authorities, rather
than journalists. 57 Moreover, the protection typically afforded is of
dubious benefit, because it tends to only redress retaliatory firings that
are not easy to prove. 58 Sarbanes-Oxley carries forth the legislative
concern for whistleblowers in a number of ways. First, it requires
whistleblowing by lawyers who observe fraudulent actions taken by the
corporations that employ them. 59 Second, it provides protection for
employee-whistleblowers, but only if they provide information to
appropriate governmental authorities. 60 Thus this legal protection is not
a significant aid to would-be whistleblowers wishing to convey

55. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the
Whistle to the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media
Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151 (1994) (discussing attempts to “kill the
messenger”); TERANCE D. MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK 73-78 (1999). Carleen
Hawn, The Women of Enron: Corporate Cassandra, FASTCOMPANY, Sept. 2003, at 80
(pointing out how Margaret Ceconi, one of two prominent whistleblowing Enron
employees, has lost friends as well as her job as a result of going to the SEC with
allegations of fraud in the accounting of profits from “bundled” energy contracts at
Enron Energy Services).
56. For a full discussion of legislative protections for whistleblowers at both the
state and federal level, see generally Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead
Dworkin, Employee Disclosures to the Media: When is a “Source” a “Sourcerer”?, 15
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357 (1993).
57. See generally id.
58. See generally id.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A) (2002). Whistleblowing to journalists is not protected
under Sarbanes-Oxley.
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information to journalists.
Nevertheless, the actual and potential role of whistleblowers must
not be minimized, particularly in the context of financial journalists’
enforcement efforts. Viewed in this context, whistleblowers face fairly
minimal risk because they are able to notify journalists confidentially
about wrongdoing, and where to look to ferret it out. Particularly in
large corporations, with many employees, the risk of unwanted
discovery of the whistleblowers’ identity should be small. 61 In spite of
these concerns, whistleblowers can play an important role in funneling
journalists toward appropriate targets of investigation.
2. Other Journalistic Techniques
While whistleblowers represent one way for corporate information
to land in the hands of journalists, old-fashioned reporting stands as
another. Not only can insiders seek access to journalists, but journalists
are trained to infiltrate organizations by developing sources. They make
themselves known to people around a corporation by establishing a
physical presence. They may frequent local eateries, or other hangouts
like bars and fitness clubs, to make their presence known. Through
patient development of relationships and persistent questioning, they
establish channels of communication that ultimately lead to revelation
by piecing together disparate bits of information.
But where does a journalist start? How does a journalist know
where to focus her efforts? How does she distinguish the honest
companies from the ones where the wrongdoing is going on?
One answer comes from the recent corporate mega-scandals. There
are several ways a journalist might find his or her way to a story. By
focusing on an industry, and observing the general practices,
competitive strategies, and successes and failures of various industry
players, a journalist can come to more sensitively understand the actions
of a given corporation that seem to not fit its competitors’ patterns.62
61. Of course one can imagine carefully managed frauds in which access to
information about the wrongdoing is narrowly confined and carefully monitored. In
such a situation, perpetrators could deduce the source of the information once it
becomes public, but it seems reasonable to believe that many frauds are not so
fastidiously managed.
62. This method was useful to Jonathan Weil in his investigation of Enron. By
understanding the difficulties Enron’s competitors were having in the
telecommunications field, Weil developed a skepticism about certain of Enron’s claims
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Another crucial component of a financial journalist’s legwork
involves carefully reading SEC disclosure filings. Auditor’s footnotes
are of particular interest to anyone interested in understanding the true
financial condition of a reporting company, as they often provide clues
to creative, aggressive or fraudulent accounting practices.
A skillful journalist thus has many tools at his or her disposal to
develop information that can be used to track down information about
corporate wrongdoing. The next Part describes several ways that
journalists can affect corporate governance by reporting what they have
learned.
III. ROLES JOURNALISTS PLAY.
Financial journalists can play several distinct roles in corporate
governance. First, in their capacity as investigative watchdog, they can
discover and report financial fraud, and instigate a market-based
response that, in combination with governmental investigations, will put
an end to the fraud. 63 Second, their reporting can uncover wrongful
corporate market conduct and thereby alert traditional players in the
legal system and set them into action to correct it. In this respect, they
are stalking hounds for regulatory enforcement officials and plaintiffs’
attorneys. Regulatory investigators will get the scent of the hunt from
journalists then use their subpoena power to further root out misbehavior
and bring appropriate judicial or administrative proceedings. 64
Third, financial journalists can play an important role in corporate
compliance litigation, under both state and federal law. By reporting on
illegal corporate market conduct, journalists can create a sort of external
monitoring and reporting system, against which courts can measure the
efficacy of internal compliance programs required under state and
federal law. Although the Delaware courts currently embrace a
management-friendly standard for evaluating the sufficiency of
corporate compliance programs, that deferential standard may evolve
into something more demanding if journalists consistently display an
ability to outperform those compliance programs. 65
The fourth function of financial journalists—helping ensure
of profitability. See infra Part III.A.
63. See infra Part III.A.
64. See infra Part III.B. The same can be said for plaintiffs’ attorneys, with
discovery as a stand-in for the subpoena.
65. See infra Part III.C.

2007

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL JOURNALISTS

333

enforcement of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act—is somewhat more indirect,
but nevertheless significant. I am referring to the political influence that
high profile financial reporting can exert on Congress. Since the SEC
has primary responsibility for the enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley, and
Congress controls the SEC’s budget, there is a significant capacity for
Congress to undercut the efficacy of the new federal corporate
governance norms by limiting SEC funding. In the absence of effective
investigative reporting by financial journalists, it is less likely that
corporate scandals will receive popular national attention. In such an
atmosphere of quiet on the corporate scandal front, Congress will be
able to scale back enforcement funding for the SEC without any public
outcry. If, by contrast, corporate scandals remain present in the popular
mind, political pressure on Congress to do something about the matter
will accumulate, and self-interested legislators will want to be able to
demonstrate to constituents that they have done something about the
problem. In this way, the fourth function of financial journalists can be
achieved. 66
Under such conditions, the problems of divergence of interests can
be harmonized on all fronts: the journalists have done their job of
promoting the public welfare by bringing misbehavior to light and
having it corrected or addressed by the appropriate authorities. In so
doing, they have enhanced their reputations and careers, and have earned
their pay. The legislators have, though with some arm twisting,
legislated in the public interest rather, than acting in the sole interests of
K Street lobbyists and their corporate benefactors. Finally, and most
importantly for corporate law, corporate managers and directors will, as
a result of heightened enforcement corporate law norms, conform their
behavior to their proper role of maximizers of shareholder wealth.
The importance of journalists to corporate law is not merely an
academic observation.
Both state and federal law explicitly
acknowledge the utility of journalism as part of the system of
shareholder litigation, both under Rule 10b-5, and state fiduciary law.
The procedural hurdles that confront shareholders seeking to bring a
derivative action effectively mandate reliance on journalistic reports of
company activity. When a shareholder brings a derivative action, the
first obstacle is the requirement that the shareholder either make demand
upon the board of directors to bring the action itself (a certain path to
oblivion for the action), or demonstrate to the court that demand would
66.

See infra Part III.D.
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be futile and ought to be excused. This latter option, the only viable
course of action, is further impeded by the requirement that the plaintiff
must plead particularized facts that raise a reasonable doubt that the
board is capable of making “an independent decision about whether to
assert the claim if demand were made.” 67 This pleading requirement is
made all the more difficult by a rule forbidding discovery to acquire the
facts needed to be alleged. 68 Instead of discovery, the Delaware courts
instruct plaintiffs that they are relegated to the “tools at hand,” judicial
jargon for SEC disclosure materials, minute books, and, most
significantly for our purposes, news reports. 69 Thus, Delaware corporate
law expressly recognizes the importance of financial journalism, and it
is relied on as an integral component of the corporate litigation system. 70
Federal securities law imposes similar informational obstacles to
litigants seeking to sue under Rule 10b-5. In 1996, Congress, having
formed the impression that meritless securities litigation was flooding
the federal courts, 71 amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
impose significant procedural hurdles upon plaintiffs in securities fraud
class actions. The heightened pleading requirements of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 72 similarly require
the pleading of particularized facts sufficient to support a claim of
fraud. 73 As in Delaware, PSLRA combines heightened pleading with a
more dramatic deviation from prior securities fraud law: plaintiffs do not
have access to discovery until they have survived the motion to
dismiss. 74 So how are 10b-5 plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss

67.
68.
69.

Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216-19 (Del. 1996)
DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1.
See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2000) (en banc); Rales
v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993); White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356 (Del.
Ch. 2000) aff’d, 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001) (stating that a shareholder may “rely on the
truthfulness of reports published by reputable media . . .”) Id. at 364,
70. For a thorough discussion of litigants’ use of the “tools at hand,” see Stephen
A. Radin, The New Stage of Corporate Governance Litigation: Section 220 Demands,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1595 (2002).
71. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998) (expressing
skepticism about the perceived excesses of federal securities litigation).
72. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-69,
109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000).
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(b), 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2000). See also Borden, supra note 47
at 685-94 (discussing PSLRA’s provisions and the legislative process that led to its

2007

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL JOURNALISTS

335

without access to discovery? By using the same litany of information
sources available under state law, with journalistic reporting playing an
often crucial role.
Another point of intersection between corporate law and journalism
is found in Regulation FD (“Reg FD”), promulgated by the SEC in
2001. Reg FD, which prohibits selective disclosure to analysts and other
market professionals, impacts journalism in a somewhat indirect fashion.
As will be discussed in Part IV, by putting journalists on something of
an even footing with analysts, Reg FD creates interesting ways for
journalists to affect corporate governance.
A. Investigative Journalists Can Uncover a Deep Fraud and Initiate a
Market-Based Response: The Case of Enron.
The house of cards that was Enron persisted for years right under
the noses of every analyst and journalist in the country, not to mention
the SEC. But one enterprising journalist was able to begin to penetrate
the dense enigma that Enron’s financial reporting had become.
Jonathan Weil, a young reporter for the Wall Street Journal’s Texas
regional edition, received a call from a source who told him, “[y]ou
really ought to take a look at . . . Enron.” 75 Spurred by this rather
nondescript suggestion, Weil embarked on a two month investigation.
After steeping himself in the subtleties of accounting for energy
derivatives, consulting with accounting and derivatives experts, and
interviewing executives at Enron and its competitors, he looked
carefully at Enron’s SEC filings. 76 Applying his skeptical eye to the
financial disclosure, Weil concluded that Enron’s stated earnings might
be substantially inflated. He reported that Enron’s “gain on sale”
accounting methods, a method that treated certain unrealized gains from
long-term energy related contracts and other derivatives as current
profits, were allowing the company to apply undisclosed assumptions
about future market conditions to those transactions, thereby booking
highly suspect current profits to sustain its share price. 77
enactment).
75. Scott Sherman, ENRON: Gimme an E: Uncovering the Covered Story, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 22. available at http://www.cjr.org/issues/
2002/2/enron-sherman.asp.
76. See id.
77. Jonathan Weil, Energy Traders Cite Gains, But Some Math Is Missing, WALL.
ST. J. (Texas Journal regional insert), Sept. 20, 2000 at T1.
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Weil’s article, for which he was eventually widely credited in
journalistic circles as being the first journalist to break the Enron story,
did not cause a splash when it was written. The article, published on
September 20, 2000 in an insert in the Texas regional edition of the Wall
Street Journal, was not picked up in the national edition. Nor did Weil
follow up his story with more reporting.
Nevertheless, the article began a cascade of events that led to the
company’s unraveling. The article was read by James Chanos, an astute
hedge fund manager who used Weil’s analysis as a starting point for his
own research. 78 Digging through Enron’s SEC filings with a skeptical
eye, Chanos became convinced that Enron was not being forthright in its
disclosures.
Chanos pieced together bits of publicly available
information about the company to confirm his hunch: that Enron had
poor return on invested capital; its executives were selling shares
regularly; and its debt was rising. He also tried, and failed, to make
sense of a three-paragraph disclosure in a 2000 10-Q about Enron’s
dealings with a related party. 79 He found it entirely incomprehensible.
After discussing it with numerous securities lawyers, derivative
specialists and other experts who found it equally impenetrable, Chanos
concluded that the company was trying to hide something significant.
Finally, Chanos used what he knew about the telecommunications
industry to cast doubt upon Enron’s claims that its broadband business
was a cash cow. 80 Having started with Weil’s article, Chanos ultimately
convinced himself that Enron was in trouble. Within weeks of the
publication of Weil’s article, Chanos was taking a large short position on
Enron’s stock, betting that its price would fall. 81
Fortune Magazine’s Bethany Mclean had been in contact with
Chanos in early 2001 and he told her that his firm was skeptical of
Enron. 82 He gave her a few reasons why, and she set out to write an
exposé on Enron seeking to get to the bottom of the question of how

78.
79.

MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 50, at 320.
Lessons Learned from Enron’s Collapse: Auditing the Accounting Industry:
Hearing before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 71-86 (2002)
(statement of James Chanos, Kynikos Associates, Ltd.) (explaining how Weil’s article
highlighting Enron’s use of “gain on sale” accounting piqued Chanos’ interest in taking
a closer look at Enron).
80. See id.
81. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 50, at 320-21.
82. McLean stated that she “would never have thought of looking at Enron if
[Chanos] hadn’t tipped [her] off.” Sherman, supra note 75.
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Enron makes its money. The result of McLean’s careful research and
analysis was a cover story published on February 19, 2001, entitled “Is
Enron Overpriced?” 83 McLean’s article was the first nationally
prominent analysis of the house of cards that Enron was ultimately
revealed to be. Not surprisingly, her reporting caused quite a furor at
Enron. While Mclean was interviewing company president Jeffrey
Skilling, he became enraged at her penetrating questioning and hung up
on her. 84
Sensing that the Fortune article could be seriously damaging, Enron
sent a delegation including CFO Andrew Fastow, PR chief Mark Palmer
and Mark Koenig, the company’s head of investor relations, to Fortune’s
New York office at dawn the very next morning. 85 Meeting for two
hours with McLean and two of her editors, the executives tried to cast
the company’s financial position in the best possible light, but left
without convincing the journalists that McLean’s account ought to be
changed. In one last desperate ploy, Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay
called Fortune’s managing editor and suggested he spike the piece. 86
Rik Kirkland refused, and by February 28, Enron’s stock price had
dropped from $82 in early January to $68.50. This fall in Enron’s stock
price continued over the summer, as more and more investors ceased the
willing suspension of disbelief that had buoyed the shares through the
previous several years.
The downward momentum in Enron’s share price was fueled by a
series of news articles written by an ever-widening circle of journalists
who followed Weil and McLean’s trail.
On May 9, 2001,
TheStreet.com published a story raising questions about Enron’s related
party transactions. Then, in August 2001, Jeffrey Skilling resigned after
only six months as CEO, a development that led the Wall Street
Journal’s duo of Rebecca Smith and John Emshwiller to begin an
extensive investigation of the company that produced several prominent
stories. 87 Their highly damaging revelations detailing Enron’s special
83.
84.
85.
86.

Bethany McLean, Is Enron Overpriced?, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.
MCLEAN AND ELKIND, supra note 50, at 322.
Id.
See Sherman, supra note 75.
87 See, e.g., Rebecca Smith and John R. Emshwiller, Enron Prepares to Become
Easier to Read, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2001 at C1; Rebecca Smith and John R.
Emshwiller, Enron Jolt: Investments, Assets Generate Big Loss—Part of Charges Tied
to 2 Partnerships Interests Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2001 at C1; Rebecca Smith
and John R. Emshwiller, Partnership Spurs Enron Equity Cut—Vehicle is Connected to
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purpose entity financing led to the company’s implosion.
So what can the story of Weil, Chanos, McLean and others tell us
about the role of journalists in the scheme of corporate governance?
Enron was an enormous fraud that endured several years before any
analyst or journalist noted even a scent of trouble. It was a failure of
corporate governance on almost every level. Enron’s SEC disclosure
was fraudulent, and the SEC never knew until it was far too late. For
years, the market rewarded Enron’s chicanery. Gatekeepers, from
document-shredding accountants, to opinion-letter-writing lawyers, to
stock-hyping securities analysts, either passively acquiesced, or actively
participated in the wrongdoing.
But through a combination of skepticism, hard work, ability to
analyze accounting reports, and cooperation with analysts and other
experts, a couple of journalists got the story right and brought the fraud
into the light. Weil got the ball up in the air where it was taken up by
Chanos, who tipped McLean. Little by little, the story came out and the
market responded. Once Enron’s share price began its decline, more
and more journalists took up the cause. Finally, the SEC got involved
and the legal process was underway.
Many have criticized the press for being asleep at the switch during
Enron’s high-flying days, and no single journalist can be credited fully
with bringing the perpetrators of the Enron fraud to justice. But the
Enron debacle was years in the making, and journalists played a major
part in its undoing.
We can expect that the notoriety and acclaim McLean and others
garnered will not go unnoticed by others in their profession. If notoriety
and acclaim are not enough, surely some will notice the $1.4 million
dollar advance McLean shared with her co-author, Peter Elkind, for
writing The Smartest Guys in the Room. 88 Weil went from being a
Financial Officer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001 at C1; Rebecca Smith and John R.
Emshwiller, Enron CFO’s Partnership Had Millions in Profit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19,
2001 at C1; John R. Emshwiller, Enron Transaction Raises New Questions—A
Company Executive Ran Entity that Received $35 Million in March, WALL ST. J., Nov.
5, 2001 at A3; Rebecca Smith and John R. Emshwiller, Trading Places: Fancy Finances
Were Key to Enron’s Success, and Now to Its Distress—Impenetrable Deals Have Put
Firm in Position Where it May Lose Independence—Talks with Rival Dynegy, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 8, 2001 at A1; Rebecca Smith and John R. Emshwiller, Running on
Empty—Enron Faces Collapse As Credit, Stock Dive, and Dynegy Bolt—EnergyTrading Giant’s Fate Could Reshape Industry, Bring Tighter Regulation—Price Quotes
Suddenly Gone, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001 at A1.
88. Eric Celeste, The Claim Game, DALLAS OBSERVER, Apr. 4, 2002.
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reporter for the Texas Journal to being named national accounting
correspondent for the Wall Street Journal. 89 All of this suggests that
financial journalists have much to gain from effective reporting. There
is every reason to believe that more journalists will hone their skills and
focus their energies on uncovering frauds with such significant
professional rewards to be gained for doing their job well. In so doing,
they will advance their self interest and fill an important role in our
scheme of corporate governance.
B. Financial Journalists as Catalysts of Judicial and Regulatory
Process: The Recent Annuities Litigation.
Another role for the financial press is akin to the one played by
journalists in the Enron affair. In the Enron story, Weil et al. served the
system by using their investigative and analytical skills to uncover a
very deep fraud. Their reporting catalyzed a market response to the
wrongdoing, and led to the end of the fraud, and ultimately to criminal
and civil sanctions for the transgressors. The next example illustrates a
slightly different role: the press as catalysts of legal process absent
significant market ramifications of the type that followed the Enron
revelations.
This example involves inappropriate market conduct on the part of
large financial services firms engaged in sales of variable annuities. The
reporting done by financial journalists brought the wrongdoing to the
attention of plaintiffs’ attorneys who filed industry-wide class actions
that ultimately led the SEC and the National Association of Securities
Dealers to address the wrongful conduct. Although this example does
not involve the kind of impact on shareholder welfare as the sort of
corporate fraud carried out by Enron’s leaders, it is nevertheless
important because it implicates a very tricky question in corporate law.
How are shareholders to view wrongful or illegal conduct by managers
that is profitable, even in light of criminal or civil fines that may be
imposed ex-post? This is essentially a question about corporate
compliance, an area that has received renewed attention since In re
Caremark Inc. Derivative Litigation, 90 and one that affects shareholders
differently than does financial fraud. In compliance cases, wrongful
89. Weil has since left journalism for a lucrative position as Managing Director of
Glass, Lewis & Co. LLC, an independent investment research and proxy management
firm.
90. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). See infra Part III.C.
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market conduct, when detected, often causes significant losses in
shareholder wealth because of heavy fines imposed by regulatory
authorities, as well as costly settlements in private litigation.
Beginning in 1997, financial journalists began paying significant
attention to a little known, but far-reaching and costly bit of consumer
abuse perpetrated by insurance and financial services companies.
Insurance companies were making money hand over fist by making
unsuitable sales of variable annuities, a tax-deferred retirement
investment product, to investors who purchased these instruments with
moneys from their IRAs, 401(k)s and other tax deferred investment
accounts (so-called “qualified plans”). 91 The problem with such sales is
that a consumer buying an investment with tax deferred dollars has no
need for the most valuable feature of a variable annuity (tax deferral),
and would get the same benefits by buying a mutual fund and
annuitizing it at retirement. But commissions earned by salespersons
and fees charged by the corporations who peddled variable annuities
were much higher for variable annuities than for mutual funds.
Salespersons, induced by large commissions, inappropriately sold tens
of billions of dollars of variable annuities into qualified plans. As a
result, investors lost tens of millions of dollars of retirement funds by
paying outsized fees and commissions. This abusive sales practice had
persisted industry-wide for over a decade, with no notice from any of the
regulatory agencies. 92
91. A variable annuity is a two-part investment product. During the first phase, the
“accumulation phase,” a variable annuity works like a mutual fund. The investor
chooses from a menu of investment options reflecting his risk and return preferences
and the shares in the fund grow, tax deferred, for a period of years. This tax-deferral is
of considerable value, because gains from mutual funds sold independently of annuities
are taxed annually. Over time, the savings are considerable. During the second phase,
the annuitization phase, the money in the fund is annuitized, and the investor receives a
guaranteed monthly or quarterly payment for as long as she lives. In this way, a
variable annuity can be a meaningful hedge against the risk of outliving one’s assets.
The problem is that the excessive commissions, management fees and other charges
assessed by the purveyors of mutual funds eat much of the tax savings, leaving the
investor at the end of the accumulation phase with a much smaller pot of money to
annuitize and thus a smaller annuity for life. By contrast, had the investor placed the
money from her 401(k) or IRA in a mutual fund, she would have received the same taxdeferred growth without the excessive charges. Upon retirement she could have placed
the accumulated wealth in an annuity or disposed of it otherwise, as she saw fit. See
Borden, supra note 47, at 702-07.
92. For a more complete discussion of the unsuitable sales of variable annuities and
the litigation and regulatory action that followed, see Borden, supra note 47, at 702-07.
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However, the June 1996 cover of Fortune magazine screamed in
huge typeface: “The Great Annuities Rip-Off.” Soon, a flood of articles
in major publications featured headlines decrying this scandal. 93 By
early 1998, the prominent plaintiffs’ firm Milberg, Weiss, Bershad,
Hynes & Lerach had taken up the cause and had sued virtually all major
purveyors of variable annuities. 94
It turns out that the media coverage that brought national attention
to these inappropriate sales had attracted some attention among
plaintiffs’ attorneys. In fact, Ron Uitz, a Washington attorney who had
become aware of the problem arranged a meeting with partners at
Milberg Weiss in an attempt to induce the powerful firm to initiate
litigation against several insurance companies. The class action
specialists initially declined to pursue the matter, but within days of this
first meeting, another article on unsuitable sales of variable annuities
appeared in the Wall Street Journal. 95 After discussing this article, the
partners at Milberg Weiss called Uitz and asked him for another
meeting, during which they decided that the matter deserved their
attention. 96 The attorneys soon filed class action complaints against
over twenty major insurance companies. The litigation that followed
generated significant settlements as well as regulatory action, not to
mention substantial amounts of billable hours put in by this writer and
countless other attorneys.
Not only did the reports in the financial media bring the
93. See, e.g., Ellen E. Schultz & Bridget O’Brian, Annuity Buyers May Be
Overdosing on Tax Deferral, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1997 at C1; David Franecki, Caution
Is Urged on Annuities and IRAs, WALL ST. J., July 20, 1998 at C1.
94. Ron Panko, Can Annuities Pass Muster? Attorneys take Insurance Companies
to Court, BEST’S REV., July 1, 2000, at 103; Deborah Lohse & Bridget O’Brian,
Lawyers Seek Class Action Against Insurers over Annuities, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 1999,
at C1. In 2003, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP was separated into two
groups. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP served as the continuing firm. On
January 1, 2007, Milberg Weiss & Bershad LLP became the name of the firm.
95. See Schultz & O’Brian, supra note 93, at C1.
96. The account of how the Wall Street Journal article instigated the litigation was
provided in an e-mail from Ronald Uitz. E-mail from Ronald Uitz, (Aug. 14, 2006) (on
file with the author). The lead attorney in the variable annuities litigation reports that
“[w]e . . . were looking at a number of possible theories, advanced by various
specialized lawyers . . . , for claims against annuity issuers at the time. [Uitz’s] idea
came to the forefront because it seemed the most persuasive theory, applied against the
most flagrant abuse—and the article may have had some effect in helping us realize
that.” E-mail from Michael Spencer, Milberg Weiss (Feb. 13, 2007) (on file with
author).
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wrongdoing to the attention of plaintiffs’ lawyers, but they also provided
a substantial amount of information that ended up in the class action
complaints served in the cases. As a young attorney working for a firm
that represented a number of the annuities defendants, I recall a binder
filled with news stories about annuities that was distributed to each
attorney working on the cases. Before responding to discovery requests
and interviewing our clients, we schooled ourselves on the details of
variable annuities by studying the articles in the binder. Armed with this
background, we were sufficiently expert to begin our document
production and interviewing work.
Later in 1998, and repeatedly through the years, the SEC, NASD
and state insurance regulators, prodded to action by the large quantities
of litigation in the courts, began to investigate the matter 97 and published
investor alerts warning unwary consumers of the duplicative and costly
impact of placing a variable annuity in a qualified plan. 98 Much of the
litigation ultimately settled at considerable cost to the various
corporations, with the NASD fining American Express Financial
Advisors the relatively modest sum of $350,000, and levying fines on
several other sellers totaling over $250,000. 99 Dwarfing the NASD fine
was the $215 million settlement paid to plaintiffs by American Express
Financial Advisors’ parent company. 100
If we take the $215 million settlement paid by American Express
Financial Advisors, a subsidiary of the American Express Corporation,

97. NASDR Focuses on Internal Supervision, INS. REGULATOR, July 7, 1997, at 1
(reporting that Roger B. Sherman, vice president of NASD Regulation, Inc., announced
the NASDR’s investigation of the matter to a conference sponsored by the National
Association for Variable Annuities and conveyed to attendees his concerns about sales
of variable annuities into qualified plans).
98. See NASD, Notice to Members 99-35, The NASD Reminds Members of Their
Responsibilities Regarding the Sales of Variable Annuities, 231 (May 1999) (instructing
sellers to “disclose to the customer that the tax deferred accrual feature is provided by
the tax-qualified retirement plan and that the tax deferred accrual feature of the variable
annuity is unnecessary.”); SEC Investor Alert—Variable Annuities: What You Should
Know, available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2007).
99. See Jeffrey S. Puretz & Nicole Griffin, NASD Turning up the Pressure on VA
Suitability, NAT’L UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH - FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Apr. 7,
2003, at 36; Jeff Benjamin & Rick Miller, Short Interests: AmEx Fined for Suitability
Infractions, INVESTMENT NEWS, Dec. 9, 2002, at 2.
100. Panko, supra note 94, at 103. Settlement figures for other defendants were not
disclosed.
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as an example, we might ask whether the media actually played a role
beneficial to shareholders. Perhaps it can be argued that shareholders
would have been better off if no one knew about the affair. When a
company is sued for wrongful conduct in the marketplace, the suit is
brought on behalf of a constituency to which the directors do not owe a
fiduciary duty. But that is not to say the corporation does not owe its
customers a duty of care. Such a duty comes from various sources:
common law contract doctrine, state insurance law, and state law
governing the relationship between “financial advisors” and their
clients. 101 The concurrent duties owed to both shareholders and the
public creates a tension between the quest for profit and appropriate
behavior in the marketplace. Ultimately, it is the role of the courts,
legislatures and regulatory authorities to create penalties calibrated to
deter wrongful market conduct for the protection of consumers. When
corporations seek higher profits by taking advantage of informational
asymmetries between themselves and consumers, they risk harming their
shareholders by exposing the corporation to fines, civil judgments and
settlements. The annuities litigation demonstrates the ability of
journalists to catalyze legal process benefitting both consumers and
shareholders. 102
C. Journalists Can Influence Standards of Review in Compliance
Litigation
The two preceding examples of the roles journalists can play have
focused on journalists digging up information about corporate
malfeasance and serving it to different kinds of users. In the Enron
story, the proximate users of the information were market players—
investors and analysts. In the annuities story, the users were players in
the judicial realm—plaintiffs attorneys and ultimately regulatory bodies.
The next example will illustrate a role more intrinsically legal. I will
101. For a discussion of various theories of duty applicable in the sale of variable
annuities, see Borden, supra note 47, at 722-29.
102. Interestingly, the litigation and regulatory process instigated by journalistic
reporting on variable annuities seems to have benefited neither shareholders nor the
public. On the one hand, American Express had to dole out $215 million, a settlement
that no doubt displeased its shareholders. On the other hand, it turns out that in the
years that followed the variable annuities litigation, the percentage of sales of variable
annuities that were bought by consumers with moneys from their qualified plans
actually increased. Thus this particular body of litigation may have had minimal social
value. See id. at 733-36 (emphasis added).
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demonstrate that in corporate compliance litigation, journalistic
revelations, beyond serving as a source of information for pleading and
directing discovery, can serve as a benchmark for evaluating both
corporate compliance programs and ultimately the legal standards under
which the adequacy of those programs are adjudicated.
Journalists can play an important role in corporate compliance,
governed by the landmark Delaware case, In re Caremark Derivative
Litigation. 103 The Caremark decision provides a legal framework for
dealing with one of the problems caused by the multi-layered
management structure in large corporations.
When criminal or
otherwise unlawful actions cause harm in the form of settlements,
criminal and civil fines or other charges, shareholders suffer. 104 Yet
managers and directors may be immune from personal liability in such
situations because corporation law permits firms to indemnify managers
and directors for the costs imposed in civil, criminal or regulatory
actions under many circumstances. 105 Moreover, in large corporations,
the many layers of management responsibilities make it very unlikely
that top management and directors will be aware of wrongdoing by their
subordinates. Under such a scheme of informational insulation and legal
indemnification, there is little incentive upon managers and directors to
prevent such activities and the harm they cause to shareholder welfare.
What is more, the unlawful actions involved in Caremark, AllisChalmers, and similar compliance cases frequently involve profitable
activities that enrich shareholders, at least to the extent that they do not
come to the attention of legal authorities.
Revisiting a 1963 Delaware Supreme Court ruling viewed as highly
deferential to management, 106 the recent Caremark case suggests, in
dicta, that in order to avoid liability for breach of the duty of care,
management must establish a rationally devised internal monitoring and
supervision structure, commonly known as a compliance program, to
ensure that wrongdoing be detected and rectified. Whereas the older
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers case has been likened to the one-bite rule for
dog owners, 107 the Caremark decision clarified that managers and
103.
104.

698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
For example, in Caremark, a government investigation of criminal activities by
employees of Caremark and its predecessor resulted in fines and settlements totaling
more than $250 million. Id. at 970.
105. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 145 (2006).
106. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
107. Kellye Y. Testy, Adding Value(s) to Corporate Law: An Agenda for Reform, 34
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directors are not immune from liability for wrongful acts by
subordinates unless a rationally designed compliance system is in place.
Yet Caremark has been criticized as a paper tiger, both because it
provides management with a significant safe harbor from liability, and
because legally adequate compliance programs are insufficiently
rigorous to detect much wrongdoing. 108 The lack of rigor stems from
the deferential legal standard used to adjudicate liability for managers’
failure to monitor. An outgrowth of the business judgment rule, the
Caremark standard only requires good faith in designing the monitoring
and reporting system. As Chancellor Allen wrote:
The level of detail that is appropriate for [the required] information
system is a question of business judgment. And obviously too, no
rationally designed information and reporting system will remove the
possibility that the corporation will violate laws or regulations, or
that senior officers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be
misled or otherwise fail reasonably to detect acts material to the
corporation’s compliance with the law. But it is important that the
board exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s
information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate
to assure the board that appropriate information will come to its
attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so
109
that it may satisfy its responsibility.

The Caremark case is important for our purposes because
compliance presents another role for journalists in corporate law. As
things currently go, journalists already play a role in the Caremark
scheme. Litigants commonly rely on news reports in the preliminary
phases of derivative actions alleging breaches of the duty to monitor. 110
Plaintiffs frequently rely on newspaper stories to formulate the
allegations in their complaints. Indeed this reliance is inevitable, given

GA. L. REV. 1025, 1040 (2000).
108. See Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good
Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691 (2004).
109. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
110. See, e.g., Landy v. D’Alessandro, 316 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60 (Dist. Mass. 2004)
(complaint alleging that Wall Street Journal reports put defendants on notice of
wrongdoing); Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589, 594 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (complaint
relying on New York Times article showing that, despite contrary claims to regulators,
company officials were aware of safety hazard that led to tort liability). But see Saito v.
McCall, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205 at 33 (commending allegations in complaint that
went “beyond articles in trade magazines and newspapers”).
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the lack of access to discovery in the early stages of a derivative action,
and Delaware’s mandate to rely on the “tools at hand,” 111 including
news media reports. Journalistic reporting can thus serve the procedural
function of aiding a litigant in getting past a motion to dismiss. Beyond
this initial stage, once a complaint survives the motion to dismiss, the
factual premises relayed by journalists can serve as a starting point for a
more in-depth investigative process once discovery begins. This use of
journalistic reports is essentially the one described in the context of the
annuities litigation. 112
But on a deeper level, journalistic reporting can serve a more
intrinsic legal function in Caremark litigation. Journalists’ work might
come to be used as a benchmark for judging the efficacy of a
compliance system. Management defendants frequently argue, with
success, 113 that despite the existence of their compliance program, they
were nevertheless unaware of the wrongdoing alleged. 114 In so arguing,
they rely on the director-friendly standard (rationally designed in good
faith) announced in Caremark. If plaintiffs are routinely able to defend
on the basis of a minimally functional monitoring and reporting system,
then the situation arises in which we can imagine a competition between
journalistic reporting and the internal reporting of a compliance
program. What will courts make of the fact that plaintiffs are
consistently able to allege factual matters made public by newspapers,
but allegedly unknown to corporate managers with the aid of a
compliance system? Perhaps this portends some instability in Caremark
jurisprudence.
Take, for example, the facts of Caremark itself. Shareholders sued
Caremark after the company settled regulatory enforcement actions for
over $250 million for making illegal payments to doctors for referrals,
transactions that were carried out by mid-level functionaries. 115 At the
time of the governmental investigations that led to the settlement,
Caremark had a compliance system in place. Evidently it did not
work. 116 Yet it is not hard to imagine journalists easily uncovering
111.
112.
113.

See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248 (Del. 2000).
See supra Part III.B.
See, e.g., In re Abbot Labs: Derivative Shareholders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809
(7th Cir. 2003).
114. See Ash v. McKesson HBOC, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144 (Del. Ch. 2000).
115. See In re Caremark Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 961 (Del. Ch. 1996).
116. As is typical with shareholder derivative suits, the Caremark case settled, so the
court did not rule on the adequacy of Caremark’s compliance system. Nevertheless, the

2007

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL JOURNALISTS

347

details about the illegal activities. Recall that journalists often find
information about a company from sources outside the company, not by
asking insiders. By talking to Caremark’s competitors, and the
physicians with whom it did business (and others with whom it did not),
a reporter could, without much trouble, have found out about the illegal
payments at issue in the case.
With reporters discovering and publishing information that
compliance systems might miss, the excessive generosity to defendants
of the Caremark standard comes into vivid focus. But it is unclear
whether such a development will cause the Delaware courts to
reconsider this deferential standard. That does not necessarily mean that
reporting on compliance issues will be ineffectual. Rather, it is fully
possible that a series of compliance cases finding managers not liable,
but found to have been scooped by reporters about wrongdoing going on
under their noses, may still have a positive effect on governance. One
possibility is that even while escaping liability, the directors might suffer
such embarrassment, or damage to their reputation, that they generally
will begin to take compliance more seriously. Another possibility is that
judges, bound by Caremark to absolve culpable behavior, will take the
opportunity to shame the managers in question in the way that David
Skeel has suggested. 117 Given the awkwardness of cases continually
involving publicly reported illegality that escapes the attention of a
rationally devised compliance system, judges applying Caremark might
feel a need to impose the only sanction they have at their disposal:
expressions of opprobrium.
Alternatively, and more optimistically, the judicial understanding of
what comprises a rationally devised compliance system could change to
reflect the reality that internal monitoring ought, as a legal matter, to be
able to detect wrongdoing that curious journalists are able to detect.
Such a reform, however, seems fairly unlikely. One reason for such
pessimism is that the incongruence I have suggested between what
compliance systems detect and what journalists detect is based upon
aggregate experience; litigation under Caremark, and the business
judgment rule, only embrace the facts of the case before the court, and
the experience of the compliance system in question. Where the legal
rule asks only that the defendants act in good faith and in a rational

ease with which the standard is satisfied has been clearly announced by the Delaware
courts.
117. See Skeel, supra note 24 at 1823-26.
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manner, the cumulative experience of other companies, other illegal
acts, and other journalists is not relevant to the judicial inquiry under
Caremark.
It is possible, however, that Delaware Caremark jurisprudence
post-Enron may come to embrace a more demanding standard. In a
2003 law review article, then-Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court Norman Veasey discussed the tension between the deference of
the business judgment rule and the “evolving expectations of the
standards of conduct of directors and others,”118 particularly in the
context of the duty of good faith. While being careful not to commit to a
change in the court’s approach, Veasey noted:
[A]s a matter of prudent counseling, boards should be told that it is
arguable—but not settled—that the issue of good faith may be
measured not only by the evolving expectations of directors in the
context of Delaware common law fiduciary duty, but also against the
119
backdrop of Sarbanes-Oxley and the SRO requirements . . . .

In Veasey’s reference to Sarbanes-Oxley, we see an example of the
intersection of state and federal corporate law—in this case federal
criminal enforcement against corporations.
Federal criminal
prosecutions of corporations are governed by guidelines set out in a
memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General entitled “Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” 120 (the “Thompson
Memo”). Under these guidelines, prosecutors are to consider various
factors in making the decision to charge a corporation. One factor to be
taken into account is the existence of a corporate compliance program.
The Thompson Memo cites Caremark but goes beyond the case’s
lenient approach, advising prosecutors to ask “is the corporation’s
program well designed? . . . [d]oes the corporation’s compliance
program work?” 121 The memo advises prosecutors to determine whether
the compliance program is “merely a ‘paper program,’ or whether it was
designed and implemented in an effective manner.” 122 Compared with
118. E. Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance
Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 2535, 2539 (2003).
119. Id. at 2144.
120. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General to Heads of
Department Components, United States Attorneys, January 20, 2003. available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
121. Id. at 9.
122. Id. at 9-10.
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Delaware’s standard of a “rationally designed” compliance program, it
appears that the Department of Justice will take a more aggressive
position in evaluating corporate compliance when pursuing criminal
actions against corporations under Sarbanes-Oxley and other federal
criminal statutes.
Indeed, the idea of using journalistic revelations as a benchmark for
evaluating internal corporate monitoring has a particular application
under Sarbanes-Oxley. Section 404 of the Act requires managers of
issuing companies to report annually on the effectiveness of their
company’s financial reporting internal controls. 123 It is as yet unclear
how aggressively the SEC will enforce this provision, and how much
latitude it will grant issuers whose internal controls fail to adequately
obstruct would-be falsifiers. It will be interesting to see whether the
federal courts adopt a more searching standard than the Caremark
standard. In any event, if journalists routinely display an ability to
detect wrongdoing that a corporation’s internal controls are unable to
prevent or identify, plaintiffs and prosecutors will have a strong
argument that the controls were inadequate.
Perhaps Veasey was referring to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and looming litigation when invoking “evolving expectations . . . against
the backdrop of Sarbanes-Oxley.” If so, then the scholarly debate about
state-federal competition in corporate law, and the fear of a race to the
bottom, 124 takes on a more optimistic cast. Delaware courts may be
123.
124.

15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002).
See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 668 (1974) (contending that state corporate law
competition results in a race to the bottom); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate
Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 625, 630 (2004). For
a discussion of the race-to-the-top argument see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 212-27 (1991); Daniel R.
Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in
Delaware’s Corporate Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982); ROBERTA ROMANO,
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW, 2-12 (1993); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258
(1977). In the context of securities regulation, several commentators have argued for
greater regulatory competition. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L.
REV. 903 (1998); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings,
1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1; Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). For a discussion of the
race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV.
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faced with a dilemma if federal prosecution decisions, and the
prosecutors themselves, rely on journalistic accounts, as a benchmark
for evaluating the efficacy of compliance programs under the heightened
standard the Thompson Memo suggests. In such a scenario, Delaware
may find itself with cases in which journalists outperform compliance
programs deemed legally sufficient under state law, but criminally
actionable under federal law. Under such conditions, Delaware’s courts
might be expected to ratchet up the standard for what constitutes a
legally sufficient compliance program.
The foregoing analysis of the role of journalists in compliance cases
suggests that they are able to serve as more than information feeders to
markets and litigants. If journalists are able to outperform a corporate
compliance program in a particular case, whether under Caremark or
Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley, they present an argument that the
compliance program in question is inadequate. Although that argument
is not likely to succeed under the current Caremark standard, there are
signs that Delaware’s standard of good faith may evolve into something
more rigorous. Thus, beyond their utility in individual cases, journalists
may ultimately serve as a kind of Greek chorus, reminding the Delaware
courts of the inadequacy of the standard for corporate compliance
programs under Caremark.
D. Financial Journalists Can Impact the Legislative Process.
Another important recent change in the world of corporate law has
been the federalization of corporate governance. Corporate law has long
been a state matter, with Delaware leading the states in competence and
impact. In fact, the Delaware courts have arguably been the most
important governmental actors in corporate governance matters. But in
2002, Congress made its first significant modern encroachment on the
primacy of state corporate law.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed several new duties on
various corporate actors and gatekeepers aimed at reducing corporate
fraud. These provisions have been ably explained elsewhere and have
generated substantial commentary, both positive and negative. 125
Sarbanes-Oxley has met with decidedly mixed reactions from
corporate law scholars. Some believe it is a useful initial step in

L. REV. 1435, 1455-56 (1992).
125. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 21.
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improving corporate governance. Others believe its mandates are
entirely too onerous, and will create substantial friction in the economy
while bringing little in the way of benefits. 126 This Article is not
concerned with evaluating the merits of the Act; rather this Part will
consider the ways in which it has been, or will be affected by financial
journalists.
The federalization of corporate law implicates journalists in two
important respects. As I will briefly discuss in this Part, the
federalization of corporate law can be viewed, to some degree, as the
result of journalistic attention to the scandals of Enron, WorldCom and
others. But another, equally important aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley is the
continuing role the financial press will play in its ongoing vitality and
vigor.
1. The Role of Journalists in Bringing Sarbanes-Oxley into Existence.
In the early years of this decade, with headlines screaming about
various mega-scandals, it became impossible for the President and
Congress to ignore the crisis in corporate governance, and the resulting
impact on investor confidence and capital markets. One could scarcely
glance at a newspaper without being reminded of the constant
revelations of hideous corporate wrongdoing. In such an atmosphere,
the President and Congress had no choice but to confront the problem
and attempt to make strong reforms. Despite the Bush administration’s
strong pro-business bent and the President’s own personal relationship
with Kenneth Lay, the media outcry became so insistent that the
President conspicuously denounced Enron and others while proudly
trumpeting reform efforts. 127 With strong backing from the White
House, and despite opposition from corporate lobbyists used to having
their way in Washington, Congress bit the bullet and enacted SarbanesOxley. 128

126. See, e.g., Michael Schroeder, Critics Say Sarbanes-Oxley Hobbles Stocks,
Chills Risk Taking, But Upshot Is Far Less Dramatic, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2003 at C1.
127. President Bush, surrounded by smiling lawmakers, announced at the signing
ceremony that “[t]he era of low standards and false profits is over . . . . No boardroom
in America is above or beyond the law.” Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The
President; Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002,
at A1.
128. Congressional sensitivity to the public’s awareness and comprehension of the
corporate scandals was nicely expressed by Senator Jon Corzine. “The politics will be
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Although it seems intuitively obvious that media attention forced
Congress to act, it may be difficult to prove. Legislators, like many of
the actors discussed in this paper, are riven by conflicts of interest.
Although they ostensibly serve in order to legislate in the public interest,
their self-interest in retaining their seats sometimes conflicts with that
public calling. With money as the lifeblood of electoral success, and
special interests providing the bulk of that money, legislators do all they
can to appease their benefactors, even when that means failing to
appropriately address important matters of public policy. 129 Only when
policy issues become important and visible enough to the electorate will
politicians take action that displeases their corporate benefactors.130
With scandal after scandal dominating the news in 2001 and 2002, it
became impossible for Congress to avoid action. 131
determined by the circumstances . . . if we continue to see an erosion of the stock
market and more cases like Adelphia and Tyco, then it will be significant. If we see
less, then it may have less of an impact, because these can become issues that are hard
for people like my mom to understand.” Stephen Labaton & Richard A. Oppel Jr.,
Enthusiasm Waning in Congress for Tougher Post-Enron Controls, N.Y. TIMES, June
10, 2002 at A16.
129. See Stephen Labaton, Enron’s Collapse: Regulation; Audit Changes Are
Facing Major Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at C7. “Congress appears reluctant
to impose stricter standards on the accounting profession, an industry that is among its
largest political patrons . . . .” Id. This initial legislative foot dragging was overcome
as more and more scandals hit the front pages. According to one story,
The legislation has enjoyed extraordinary momentum in the last three weeks, but its
outlook had been cloudy until mid-June. While Mr. Sarbanes had managed to get the
bill out of his committee on a bipartisan vote, lobbyists and some leading Republicans
had pledged to rewrite it when it got to conference committee.
That changed, however, as the scandals at Tyco, Adelphia and WorldCom, and the
perception that the fall in the stock market stemmed from a loss of investor
confidence, made it increasingly risky for any politician to object to the measure.

Richard A. Oppel Jr., Negotiators Agree on Broad Changes in Business Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2002 at A1.
130. See Labaton & Oppel supra note 128, at A16; see also Bumiller, supra note
127, at A1.
131. See Bumiller, supra note 127; see also Patricia A. McCoy, Crisis in
Confidence: Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics Post-Enron: Realigning
Auditors’ Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 999 (2003) (asserting that
By July 23, 2002, in the month following WorldCom’s revelation that it had
overstated its cash flow by $ 3.9 billion, the S&P 500 had dropped twenty percent and
public furor over the accounting scandals had exploded. Under intense public
pressure, Congress stopped its bickering and rushed through passage of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002.

Id.
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2. Exerting Political Pressure to Ensure Adequate SEC Funding.
But the impact of media attention on the legislative process leading
to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley is only part of the picture. What
may prove more important is the media’s ongoing role in ensuring the
efficacy of SEC enforcement efforts pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley.
Perhaps it can be said that passing Sarbanes-Oxley was the easy part.
Implementation and enforcement of its provisions do not follow
automatically. The nature of federal regulatory law involves an
empowering statute, and a directive from Congress to the agency in
question authorizing the promulgation of rules and regulations pursuant
to a broad legislative mandate. Moreover, in order for the SEC to
implement and enforce the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress
must appropriate sufficient funds to make the Act more than a paper
tiger.
An important factor to be weighed when considering the good to be
accomplished by an active financial press is Congress’ relative lack of
sophistication regarding corporate governance and securities issues.132
As one commentator noted in the 1990s, “the ultimate provisions
adopted by Congress . . . reflect a deficient understanding of the
American system of corporate structuring, particularly the separation of
corporate ownership and control.” 133 Viewing Congress in this light, it
is possible to appreciate a potentially unwanted effect of a robust press.
Some commentators have argued that Sarbanes-Oxley was a hasty, illadvised, and misguided legislative stampede motivated by a desire to
respond to political pressure caused by a public demand for reform
fueled by journalistic accounts of corporate fraud. 134
132. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric,
Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 986 (2003) (asserting
that “Congress may know almost nothing about corporate law.”); Wells M. Engledow,
Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 143, 170 (2002) (noting
that “Congress may not understand efficient regulation of corporate matters.”).
133. Kurt Hartmann, Comment, The Market for Corporate Confusion: Federal
Attempts to Regulate the Market for Corporate Control through the Federal Tax Code,
6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 159, 178 (1994).
134. See Romano, supra, note 21.
The debate over the nonaudit services prohibition was, therefore, in large part a replay
of a battle over the regulation of the accounting industry fought two years earlier
when Levitt was SEC chair. But the environment this time was markedly different.
There was a media frenzy, heightened by a sharply declining stock market and highprofile accounting frauds and business failures, in the middle of an election year. For
example, the major network evening news coverage between January and July 2002
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Even assuming that these critics are correct on the merits, this may
be a case of blaming the messenger, for surely it is more accurate to say
that Sarbanes-Oxley was an ill-advised stampede instigated by the
egregious wrongdoings of corporate executives. In any event, knowing
what we know about how politicians respond to headlines importuning
crises, it is not farfetched to predict that a continuing drumbeat of press
reports highlighting financial fraud might lead to more legislative forays
that may prove to be more or less misguided. In light of Congressional
incompetence in this area of law, it is necessary to briefly consider the
institutional structure of federal regulation of corporate governance
under Sarbanes-Oxley.
While many of the substantive legal changes brought about by
Sarbanes-Oxley are in the form of legislative mandates aimed at private
actors, 135 others are directives aimed at the SEC, to implement and
enforce the policies and norms outlined by Congress in the Act. The Act
requires the SEC to promulgate rules in areas Congress identified as
needing regulation, 136 to more regularly review the filings of reporting
companies, 137 and to generate reports on various matters of concern.138
This power sharing arrangement between Congress and the SEC shifts
the burden of oversight and regulation from a less-technically competent
contained 613 stories on business, of which 471 (77%) were about corporate scandals;
of those stories, 195 connected corporations to Congress (individual members or the
institution itself), while 188 connected corporations to the Bush Administration.
These figures compare to a total of 489 business stories, of which only 52 (11%) were
about scandals, in the same period the prior year. Moreover, more than 80% of the
scandal-related stories looked to government action to address the problem. In this
charged atmosphere, Levitt’s earlier reform proposals now seemed prescient (at least
to the Democrats for whom Levitt was a source of expertise), and the accounting
industry had lost its public credibility with the audit failures.

Id. at 1590.
135. For example, Section 403 of the Act directly requires large shareholders,
directors, and officers of issuers to file statements of their stock holdings in the issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 78p (2002).
136. For example, Section 307 of the Act, requires the SEC to promulgate rules
“setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in any way in the representation of issuers . . . .” 15
U.S.C. § 7245 (2002).
137. Section 408 of the Act, requires the SEC to review the periodic disclosures of
each reporting company no less frequently than once every three years. 15 U.S.C. §
7266 (2002).
138. Section 702 of the Act requires the SEC to study and report on credit rating
agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 7202 (2002). Section 703 of the Act requires the SEC to study
and report on recent enforcement actions. 15 U.S.C. § 7203 (2002).
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body to one that is much more expert. In view of the strong influence
exerted by corporate lobbyists upon Congress, there is some reason to be
optimistic that future responses to corporate crises will be channeled
through the SEC—a much more technocratic institution. 139
If journalistic activity, and the resulting political pressure that it
may instigate, pose some hazard of misguided legislation, they also have
the potential to produce something more beneficial: pressure upon
Congress to adequately fund the SEC’s enforcement efforts. In Enron’s
wake, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley represented a significant shift in
the locus of corporate governance regulation from the states to
Congress. As mentioned, the SEC is charged with enforcement and
implementation of the new federal regulation. But regulatory oversight
requires money, and Congress must be continually prodded to
appropriate funds to ensure adequate enforcement.
There are two reasons to suspect that sufficient funding is unlikely
to materialize without public pressure. First, in an era of budgetary
deficits and significant anti-regulatory ideology, Congress will always
be looking to scale back line item appropriations in the budgeting
process. Second, as a result of special interest lobbying by powerful
corporate constituencies, legislators have conflicts of interest that inhibit
them from making responsible budgeting decisions. This conflict
further reduces the likelihood of adequate funding for the SEC.
Even in the immediate aftermath of Enron, when Congress seemed
to be implementing badly needed reforms by enacting Sarbanes-Oxley,
it continued to demonstrate the limitations in its commitment to real
corporate reform. As Professor Joel Seligman has pointed out, in July
2002 “Congress ‘authorized’ but did not then appropriate, a 66%
increase in the Commission’s budget.” 140 Only three months after the
President signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which included among its
provisions an increase in the Commission’s budget from $438 million to
$776 million, the White House requested that Congress appropriate only
$568 million for the SEC. 141 Although Bush had specifically touted the
139. The SEC’s rule-making process is marked by an active period of public input,
with corporate lawyers and other corporate interests taking full advantage of their
opportunity to comment on proposed rules.
140. See Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission,
28 NOVA L. REV. 233, 254 (2004) (arguing that the SEC’s chronic under-funding
problem could be solved by permitting it to fund itself with the fees it collects through
its normal operations).
141. See Stephen Labaton, Bush Tries to Shrink S.E.C. Raise Intended for Corporate
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heightened appropriations during the signing ceremony for the Act in the
summer of 2002, by October the political calculus had apparently
changed. By reneging on the budgeting provision, Bush apparently
believed that the public would either not pick up on the change, or that
the clamor over the scandals had become sufficiently muted that it was
safe to hold back on appropriations. 142
Ultimately, despite the White House’s attempts to roll back
funding, the SEC got most of what Congress authorized. 143 In fact, SEC
appropriations have remained strong in the years since the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley. But the continued vitality of SEC enforcement efforts
remains subject to the vicissitudes of the political horse-trading that
marks the budgeting process, and indeed the entire legislative process.
In order to ensure sufficient financial support for the enforcement
apparatus designed to prevent more Enrons, journalists must continue to
report on the legislative process in order to bring the actions of
politicians into line with their rhetoric. 144 The federalization of
corporate law thus presents new possibilities for journalists to inform a
broader swath of the public about corporate regulation.
This Part has explained various ways in which journalists contribute
to our system of corporate governance. The Enron story demonstrated
how journalists may uncover deep frauds and thus instigate market
responses to corporate fraud. The annuities story showed how
journalists’ reporting can spur legal process in the courts, by alerting
plaintiffs’ attorneys to wrongdoing in the marketplace. This legal
process can in turn alert regulators to culpable conduct that can serve as
the basis for regulatory actions, fines, and investor education. The
Caremark litigation showed how journalists can affect the way a case is
litigated, and more significantly, might, in time, contribute to a change
in the judicial standards that govern corporate conduct. I also described
Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2002, at C14.
142. Id. “Democrats said that the White House position reflected the calculation
that the corporate scandals have moved to the back burner, and therefore the White
House does not need to honor the provision in the legislation that calls for the higher
financing.”
143. Congress appropriated $716.4 million for the SEC for fiscal year 2003. See
William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concerning Appropriations for Fiscal 2004, Apr. 8,
2003, available at http://sec.gov/news/testimony/040803tswhd.htm.
144. I do not suggest that the evidence presents a particular causal link between
reporting on the budgeting process and the White House’s relenting on the size of the
increase. Instead, I suggest that continued vigilance is crucial and that journalists are an
indispensable part of that vigilance.
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how journalists might affect the legislative branch’s efforts to regulate
corporate governance, both in the passage of legislation, and in the
appropriations process that is a strong determinant of SEC effectiveness.
But in many instances, particularly in the case of accounting fraud,
one wonders whether the financial press is the right place to look for an
effective watchdog of corporate wrongdoing. Perhaps, in some contexts,
the role is better played by securities analysts, for they have superior
resources to devote to the task, and most likely have a deeper expertise
in analyzing financial data. Thus the next Part briefly explores the role
of analysts and compares their capacities and shortcomings with those of
journalists.
IV. JOURNALISTS AND ANALYSTS.
While financial journalists in various contexts have demonstrated
their ability to contribute to our scheme of corporate governance, a
thorough account of their contribution must take stock of their
weaknesses. Some might argue that, Enron notwithstanding, securities
analysts are better equipped than journalists to play the watchdog role,
particularly when detecting accounting fraud and signaling that a
company’s financial disclosures are flawed. In this Part, I will both
briefly describe some phenomena that hamper the effectiveness of
financial journalists and consider the role of securities analysts. I will
present an example of the interplay of journalists and analysts that
suggests a way that their roles might intersect. This Part will conclude
with some observations about Regulation FD that will form the basis for
future research on the intersection of journalists’ and analysts’ roles.
A. Weaknesses of Journalists
Although both theory and evidence suggest that journalists have an
important role to play in enforcement of corporate law, there are several
reasons to be skeptical of their utility, especially when compared with
securities analysts. First, journalists, like analysts, suffer from certain
conflicts that can reduce their efficacy. Second, financial journalists
may not have the same expertise in the techniques necessary to conduct
the kind of analysis required to root out more complicated frauds.
Analysts’ advanced training in quantitative methods is their stock in
trade, their most important skill.
By contrast, the educational
background of many journalists leads one to suspect that they are unable
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to competently carry out the sort of analysis needed to critically evaluate
complicated financial data, or understand the anecdotal reports they may
receive from various tippers or whistleblowers. But there is a dearth of
empirical evidence available to confirm this suspicion. The most
comprehensive report available is substantially out of date. In 1987, the
Ford Foundation published a report concluding that only 6% of
journalists had even an undergraduate degree in economics or
business. 145 That evidence, however, is misleading. Coming as it did
before the advent of cable financial news and the equity boom of the
1990s, the Ford Foundation study cannot be taken as a reliable measure
of financial journalists’ competence today. Moreover, the study focused
on journalists as a whole, without specifically focusing on financial
journalists. No study of the educational backgrounds of financial
journalists has been performed to date.
But the educational background of the vast majority of journalists is
mainly irrelevant to this article. Of greater interest is the educational
background of business and financial journalists from leading national
publications, particularly those that focus on business.
I have
publications like the Wall Street Journal, Barons, the New York Times,
the Washington Post, Forbes, Business Week, Fortune and the like in
mind. 146 Not only are these outlets able to hire the most qualified
reporters available, 147 but they also are able, as a function of both
resources and editorial mission, to support their reporters in various
ways, such as permitting them sufficient time to develop a story, hiring
experts to help sort through particularly complicated accounting and
financial material, and providing training to shore up their expertise. 148
Another impediment to financial journalists relates to the political
and ideological bent of the publishers and editors for whom a journalist
may work. For example, a publication that strongly espouses free

145. Mark Donald Ludwig, Business Journalists Need Specialized Finance
Training, NEWSPAPER RES. J., Spring 2002, at 129.
146. There are doubtless other publications that can make important contributions,
but the publications listed represent the type of publications that have the greatest
concentration of top flight reporters with significant technical backgrounds to do the
kind of in-depth financial analysis that I envision.
147. For example, the Wall Street Journal’s managing editor, Paul Steiger, a
graduate of Yale University with a degree in economics, has asserted that the
qualifications that got him hired in 1966 would be insufficient to get a job at the Journal
today. Lewis M. Simons, Follow the Money, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov. 1999, at 54.
148. Id.
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market ideology may discourage its reporters from pursuing a lead
premised on an idea antithetical to the viewpoint of the publication.
Moreover, media concentration has engendered corporate conflicts of
interest that affect financial journalists. A journalist working for a
diversified media conglomerate may find his or her efforts to investigate
fraud hamstrung by the corporate concerns of her employer if his or her
reporting leads to the discovery of information damaging to a member of
the employer’s corporate family.
Journalists also face legal threats to their effectiveness. As the New
York Times’ Judith Miller painfully discovered during the recent CIA
leak investigation, 149 journalists can wind up in jail for doing their jobs.
While this example of incarceration was no doubt exceptional, it may
have only been the beginning of a trend of legal jeopardy for journalists.
In February 2006, staff lawyers from the SEC issued subpoenas to two
Dow Jones journalists. According to Herb Greenberg, one of the two,
who reports for MarketWatch.com, the subpoena sought “all
unpublished ‘communications,’ including emails and phone records,
between me and people and organizations I’ve quoted—and at least one
I’ve never quoted—regarding five stocks.” 150
These subpoenas caused a furor among media professionals,
particularly coming as they did on the heels of the Plame investigation.
To the relief of financial journalists, Christopher Cox, Chairman of the
SEC, promptly signaled that the subpoenas were the handiwork of
“renegade” staff lawyers in the enforcement division of the SEC. 151 Cox
notified the public that neither he, nor the Commission’s Office of
General Counsel, had been aware of the decision to issue the
subpoenas. 152 To further calm the situation several weeks later, the SEC
announced a new policy containing stringent guidelines for the issuance
of subpoenas to journalists by Commission staff. 153
149.
150.

Judith Miller Goes to Jail, N.Y. Times, July 7, 2005, at A22.
Herb Greenberg, About My Subpoena, Marketwatch.com, Feb. 24, 2006,
available at http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B6800D8C
7-E199-4CE6-915A7A9D29DEE685%7D&siteid=mktw&print=true&dist=print
Bottom.
151. Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Leader Issues Rebuke Over Journalist Subpoenas,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at C3. Apparently, the subpoenas were issued without the
knowledge and approval of the head of the SEC’s enforcement division.
152. Id.
153. See Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning
Subpoenas to Members of the News Media, Release No. 34-53638, Apr. 20, 2006,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-55.htm.
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Governmental legal action is not the only source of interference
with journalists’ investigative efforts. In October 2006, Patricia C.
Dunn, chairwoman of Hewlett Packard, another director, and officers of
the corporation were accused of illegally gathering the phone records of
journalists in an attempt to discover who leaked information from a
board meeting. 154 Dunn hired investigators and provided them with
confidential personal information about board members. 155
The
investigators then posed as those board members in order to obtain their
personal telephone records. 156 Armed with this information, the
investigators were able to ascertain the identity of the leakers and collect
information about their phone conversations with journalists. 157
The HP case demonstrates one method by which a corporation can
thwart journalists’ efforts to gather information. The effect of such an
action is twofold. Not only might such espionage be effective in ending
a particular investigation, but it might also have a chilling effect on
journalists who are concerned about the invasion of privacy wrought by
techniques such as those practiced by HP.
A different kind of legal threat also lurks around financial
journalists attempting to investigate fraud. A corporation engaged in
conduct of questionable legality may threaten to sue for libel if a
publication runs a story containing damaging allegations. Faced with
such a threat, publishers are likely to suppress a story, even if the
allegations are responsibly reported and documented. SEC v. Dirks, 158
discussed below in Part IV.C, involved such a threat and a decision not
to run a story about a flagrant fraud.
Another problem with some financial journalists is self-imposed.
Over the years, journalists have occasionally engaged in opportunistic
trading in shares of the companies they’ve covered. For example, in
1993, R. Foster Winans, a Wall Street Journal reporter who co-wrote the
influential “Heard on the Street” column, revealed the contents of soonto-be published columns to a stockbroker. 159 The broker traded in
advance of the column’s appearance and earned profits of nearly
154. See Damon Darlin, Ex-Chairwoman Among 5 Charged in Hewlett Case, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 5, 2006, at A1.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
159. David A. Wilson, Note & Comment, Outsider Trading—Morality and the Law
of Securities Fraud,, 77 GEO L. J. 181 (1988).

2007

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL JOURNALISTS

361

$700,000, paying Winans $30,000 for the tip. 160 Both men were
ultimately convicted of securities fraud. 161 This kind of abuse can
undermine the public’s confidence in financial journalism, leading to the
view of journalists as wolves guarding the henhouse.
Although journalistic reporting on corporate matters suffers from
certain imperfections, it is nonetheless a significant part of our corporate
governance. But one still might ask, isn’t at least some of this role
played more effectively by financial analysts? After all, financial
analysts have the training, resources and access to top management that
journalists lack. They are paid well to scrutinize public and non-public
data in order to assess the value of corporations. This observation is no
doubt true. But the limitations of financial analysts are just as clear as
their strengths. Next I will explain what securities analysts do, whom
they work for, and review the most notable problem with securities
analysts—their conflicts of interest. Then I will briefly sketch the ways
in which the roles of both analysts and journalists intersect.
B. The Role and Conflicts of Securities Analysts.
Securities analysts are a cornerstone of the capital markets,
contributing significantly to market efficiency by collecting and
analyzing company information from numerous sources and channeling
that information into the market. 162 Securities analysts cover a company
or a handful of companies within a given industry, meticulously
researching the company’s performance, market environment, internal
operations and micro and macro-economic environment in order to
arrive at earnings estimates. These estimates ultimately provide the
basis for the analyst’s recommendations to buy, hold, or sell the
company’s securities. Estimates and recommendations are consumed by
both the analyst’s employer and, depending on the type of institution
employing the analyst, the investing public. 163
Analysts work for a variety of institutions. So-called “buy-side
analysts” work for institutional money managers like mutual funds,
160.
161.

Id.
United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp 827, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d sub.
nom., United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 19
(1987).
162. For a thorough explanation of the roles and conflicts of securities analysts, see
Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1040-56.
163. Id.
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hedge funds, and pension funds. These organizations rely on analysts’
work product to formulate investment strategies. 164
“Sell-side” analysts work for full-service broker-dealers and make
recommendations on the securities they cover. Many influential sellside analysts work for prominent brokerage firms that also provide
investment banking services for corporate clients, including companies
whose securities are covered by the analysts. Independent analysts are
typically not associated with firms that underwrite the securities they
cover. They often sell their research reports on a subscription or other
basis. Some firms, having discontinued their investment banking
operations, now market themselves as more independent than multiservice firms, touting the enhanced quality of their research their
freedom from conflicts of interest engenders. 165
Although they are more adept at analyzing financial data than
financial journalists, analysts use their expertise and the data for
different purposes. Whereas the information developed by journalists is
published for the express purpose of informing the public, analysts have
a strong proprietary interest in their information. Furthermore, unlike
public accountants, whose job it is to verify the accuracy of company
financial data in order to enhance the confidence and safety of public
investors, analysts do not have a public interest role. They are in the
business of making money.
There are positives and negatives associated with analysts’ selfinterest. On one hand, they might use the information as part of a
process identifying undervalued companies for the purpose of targeting
them for a tender offer. 166 In this way, although they are not going to
publicize the information they gather, they may ultimately use the
information as part of the market for corporate control, an important
director constraint mechanism in corporate law.
On the other hand, analysts and their institutional employers might
sell stock that they alone know is overvalued. The discrepancy in value
may be the result of an accounting sleight-of-hand transparent to an

164. SEC Investor Alert, Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, Apr. 20, 2005,
available at http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm.
165. Id.
166. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate
Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539 (1996) (explaining the benefit to the securities markets
of the informational investment made by various actors who search for undervalued
companies in order to target them for a hostile takeover).
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expert, but not to small investors; 167 or it might be overvalued simply
because of changes in market conditions that had not been publicized,
but analysts know because of their position. Whatever the reason for a
company’s shares to be temporarily mispriced, analysts’ informational
advantage can position them, and their employers, to earn profits by
engaging in market transactions with public investors. The potential for
insider trading gains can affect the objectivity of analyst reports and
recommendations. Analysts who displease issuers by aggressively
discovering and publicizing bad news risk losing access to insiders that
generates some of those trading profits.
This type of insider trading is perhaps a relatively unimportant
example of a current issue dominating scholarly discussion of analysts:
their conflicts of interest. 168 Analysts encounter a variety of conflicts of
interest that can decrease their vigor for pursuing and providing as much
objective information as possible to the markets. These conflicts stem
from various sources, including investment banking relationships,
brokerage commissions, analyst compensation, and analysts owning and
trading in company securities, as described above. 169
Not only do the potential benefits from insider trading on material
nonpublic information represent a conflict of interest for analysts, the
same can be said of the revenues that analysts bring to their employers
through lucrative investment banking engagements. 170 Sell-side analysts
have a strong disincentive to issue unfavorable recommendations
because of the risk that such actions will cause issuers to choose other
institutions to underwrite their future issuances of securities. These
underwriting engagements are extremely profitable for the investment
bank, and there is a great deal of evidence that analysts inflate their
recommendations on companies for whom the analysts’ firm serves as,
167. The moral and legal valence of this type of insider trading is a matter of intense
debate. For a discussion of insider trading, compare Stephen M. Bainbridge, Note, A
Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 455 (1985)
(arguing that the present federal prohibitions against insider trading do not achieve a
substantial deterrent effect achieve a substantial deterrent effect, with Roberta S.
Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and Prohibitions Against
Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory of Inside Information Is Untenable, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 149 (1993) (arguing that prohibitions against insider trading are
necessary to ensure that confidentiality is not abused).
168. See Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 4; Fisch & Sale, supra note 4.
169. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1043-56.
170. Id. at 1047. “In today’s world . . . the analyst is the ‘star of the show’ in a
typical investment banking bake-off, or client competition.”
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or wish to serve as, an underwriter. 171 Such inflation seems almost
inevitable, in view of the fact that analyst compensation is frequently
linked to the number of investment banking deals the analyst generates,
or the overall profitability of the firm’s investment banking division. 172
In addition, their access to top management leaves them, to some
degree, captive to that management. Since they possess the key to the
front door, they may suffer from what we might call an insider’s bias.
This bias can lead analysts to rely excessively on management’s account
of a company’s performance, neglecting the legwork necessary to fully
appreciate the reality of a corporation’s financial condition. 173
Nevertheless, it may be plausible to maintain that problems like
fraudulent financial disclosure are best dealt with by securities analysts.
When it comes to scrutinizing labyrinthine accounting structures,
analysts are often better suited than financial journalists to comprehend
both the big picture as well as the details. But as Enron demonstrated,
when corporate insiders are determined to maintain a significant level of
opacity in accounting, even the best trained quantitative analysts may be
overmatched, particularly where their conflicts of interest inhibit any
skepticism about the company’s story. 174 In such cases, journalists may
prove more effective, as was the case with Enron. Because it is likely
that someone on the inside of the company is going to know about the
fraud, the training, skeptical perspective, and methodology of a
financially savvy reporter can be the most important tool for unlocking
the fraud. Thus reporters are the antidote to the front door approach
employed by analysts.
C. The Intersection of Journalists and Analysts.
An example of the interplay between journalists and analysts can be

171. See, e.g., Coffee, Understanding Enron, supra note 4, at 1047 (noting that
“ratio of ‘buy’ to ‘sell’ recommendations increased from 6:1 in 1991 to 100:1 by
2000”); Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1052-55 (reviewing the evidence of ratings bias
and noting that “as the Internet market collapsed from spring 1999 to fall 2001, and
Merrill analysts internally described covered stock as ‘junk,’ Merrill publicly continued
to issue buy and strong buy ratings for these securities”).
172. Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1052-55.
173. See id. at 1054-56.
174. See ELKIND & MCLEAN, supra note 50, at 235 (describing the credulity of
analysts who continually accepted Enron management’s increasingly dubious claims
about its finances).
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found in Dirks v. SEC, 175 a celebrated insider trading case. Dirks stands
as an interesting example of many of the issues discussed in this Article.
Raymond Dirks was a securities analyst who covered Equity Funding, a
company engaged in a massive fraud. 176 Ronald Secrist, an executive at
Equity funding, was distressed about the fraud, and frustrated that the
SEC and other regulatory agencies were unwilling to act, despite being
notified. 177 Secrist informed Dirks of the wrongdoing, and suggested
that he investigate the matter. 178 Dirks did just that, using the access that
his position as an analyst covering the company afforded him. 179 What
Dirks found was indeed a massive and audacious fraud. 180
One of the first things Dirks did was contact William Blundell, the
Los Angeles bureau chief of the Wall Street Journal, and urge him to
write a story about the fraud, hoping to instigate SEC action. 181 The
Journal, out of a rational fear of being sued for libel, refused to move on
the story. 182
With neither the Journal nor regulators willing to act on the
information, Dirks moved to protect his clients, and advised several
large institutional investors to sell. 183 They did so and the company’s
stock price dropped precipitously. This fall ultimately led the NYSE to
suspend trading in Equity Funding shares, and the SEC initiated its
investigation thereafter. 184
So what does Dirks tell us about journalists, analysts, and
enforcement of corporate governance norms? It makes a couple of
things clear. First, and perhaps most powerfully, it illustrates the fact
that extralegal enforcement mechanisms are a vital part of the corporate
governance system. The SEC is incapable of effectively monitoring all
corporate activity for fraud. Indeed, as the case demonstrates, it does
not always act even when made aware of fraud. Our system relies on
analysts and journalists to bring fraud to the attention of both markets
and legal institutions.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 649-50.
Id. at 650.
Id. This also led the SEC to bring an insider trading action against Dirks. Id.
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Second, this case illustrates one reason to question the reliability of
journalistic enforcement: media outlets’ fear of legal retribution reduces
the likelihood of publicizing information that can lead to enforcement.
Retribution can come in various forms. In Dirks, the fear was of a libel
suit. Publishers may also fear retribution from companies refusing to
place advertisements, or withholding access to important information,
while revealing it to other journalistic outlets.
Yet upon reflection, Dirks represents a more hopeful view of
journalistic enforcement. Ignore for the moment the fact that Blundell
refused to run with Dirks’ information. Focus instead on the
opportunity that Dirks presented the Journal. This sort of cooperation
between analysts and journalists is precisely what we might imagine as
the ideal of a cooperative dynamic between journalists and analysts.
The analyst makes use of his enhanced access and familiarity with a
company and attempts to convey news of wrongdoing to both regulatory
authorities and the financial press.
D. Regulation FD: Preliminary Thoughts for Future Research
Analysts have long held a privileged position in corporate
boardrooms, frequently obtaining significant amounts of nonpublic
information directly from top executives. Analysts in turn use this
information to formulate their estimates and recommendation. While
this access is valuable to analysts when generating their estimates, it also
carries a significant public benefit. Accurate estimates preceding
quarterly public disclosures of earnings help assure efficient market
pricing of securities. 185 Rather than waiting for quarterly earnings
announcements from issuers themselves, the market is able to price
securities with substantial accuracy with the help of earnings estimates,
more often than the four times per year when companies announce their
earnings. 186
Yet the access to inside information that analysts enjoy has enabled
them to engage in profitable stock trading with public investors knowing
less about the reality of a company’s financial position than the analyst,
his employer, and its clients. 187 Concerned with this informational
185.
186.
187.

See Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1067.
See id. at 1067-68.
See Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market
Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 58 (2004) (characterizing selective disclosure
as a “mechanism for firms to subsidize analysts”).
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asymmetry, and the belief that the public was losing confidence in the
fairness of the securities markets, the SEC passed Regulation FD (for
fair disclosure) in 2000. 188 Reg FD prohibits selective disclosure of
material nonpublic information, mandating that when issuers disclose
such information to an analyst (or other covered persons) they must also
disseminate the information broadly. 189
While Reg FD has had many varied effects, and has been both
praised and criticized from various quarters, it has a particular
significance for the topic of this paper. Selective disclosures to analysts
have, as previously mentioned, served an important function in
enhancing market efficiency. But the opportunity for profits gained
through privileged inside access created a conflict of interest for analysts
that contributed to their poor performance. 190 This conflict is related to
one that has plagued national political journalists. In order to do their
jobs effectively, analysts depend on access. But if their reports include
truthful assessments damaging to the corporation, they risk losing the
access that permits the insider trading profits. 191 By ending selective
disclosure, Reg FD may quiet our concern about insider trading
conflicts, as well as conflicts related to access.
One interesting question raised by Reg FD is whether its mandates
will level the playing field between journalists and analysts. In other
words, it is possible that journalists who carefully monitor a company
will now be privy to just as much information as analysts. However, it
is also quite possible that the overall amount of information available to
both has decreased as a result of Reg FD. To be sure, many critics of
Reg FD forecast that decreased disclosure will be the primary result of
the new rule, with opponents dubbing the regulation FD for Fewer
Disclosures. 192
188.
189.
190.
191.

17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b) (2002).
Id.
See Choi, supra note 187, at 59.
See Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1054-56. “Indeed, analysts who exercise
independent judgment are often frozen out of future access. Corporate officials may
refuse to take analysts’ phone calls, prohibit employees from speaking with them, avoid
their questions in conference calls, and refuse to attend analyst-organized conferences.”
Id. at 1054.
192. Whether the rule will live up to its nickname is a complicated empirical matter,
but preliminary evidence suggests that the quantity of disclosure has not fallen off
significantly. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 4, at 1066-67 (reviewing the nascent body
of empirical evidence generated in the first years after the implementation of Reg FD).
In any event, it is not clear that this line of inquiry is really relevant to the key questions
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Soon after Reg FD became effective, many analysts began to
complain that the new rule forced them to work harder for information
that had once been spoon-fed to them in the form of earnings
guidance. 193 While this deprivation has no doubt proven inconvenient
for many analysts, it has also created a new opportunity. In order to
perform at a high level of competence, and with the reliability the
market demands, analysts now have to do more legwork to arrive at an
accurate estimate of corporate earnings.
Not only does this provide an opportunity and incentive for analysts
to distinguish themselves in the market for securities research, but it also
liberates them, to some extent, from the negative market effects of their
symbiotic relationship with issuers. Since the prohibition of selective
disclosures to analysts (and analysts’ concomitant loss of inside trading
profits), issuer executives have lost some of the leverage they once had
over analysts—losing inside access is now less of a threat. Thus
analysts should, post-Reg FD, be free from their debt to issuers to
provide a quid pro quo in the form of flattering ratings for access.
To be sure, this effect does not resolve other conflicts, but it does
create the possibility of more vigorous research that may uncover
wrongdoing. Analysts’ other conflicts, particularly the need to generate
investment banking revenues, remain problematic and may constrain
analysts from directly disclosing any unflattering information they
discover. But this incentive to research more aggressively may
nevertheless redound to the benefit of investors, if analysts were to
discreetly share such information with journalists. 194 In this way, highly
trained specialists, who have substantial access to company data and
employees, can channel useful information to the public without
harming their institutional interests in maintaining positive client
relations.
The Dirks story, and my conjectures about Reg FD, suggest that
there is more to be studied about the interrelation between financial
addressed by this article; the kinds of information voluntarily disclosed by issuers are
not likely to include information that will reveal frauds.
193. Id. at 1066.
194. Of course an analyst would be taking a risk that divulging unflattering
information to a journalist would lead to recriminations by the issuer. But, recall that
Jonathan Weil was tipped discreetly by a source who told him “you really ought to take
a look at . . . Enron.” See Sherman, supra note 75. Concerns about retaliation and
confidentiality could be minimized by tactful indications of where to look for
wrongdoing.
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journalists and securities analysts. As more time passes since the
enactment of Reg FD, observers will be able to determine whether they
can in fact work together to provide timely, objective information about
issuers, in a way that supports the investing public’s interests, while
leaving analysts’ legitimate financial interests intact.
CONCLUSION
This Article has furnished an account of how financial journalists
fit into our system of corporate governance. By detailing the ways in
which journalists contribute to that system, I have demonstrated their
utility in multiple contexts: judicial, legislative, administrative, and
market-oriented. Journalists can catalyze both legal process and market
responses to corporate wrongdoing. Beyond contributing to the legal
system as it exists, journalists may be able to affect the evolution of
corporate compliance jurisprudence by proving the inadequacy of
legally sufficient corporate compliance programs. In the future, lawyers
may be able to draw on the work of journalists to argue that judges must
heighten the legal standards for evaluating such programs.
I have also demonstrated that financial journalists, while operating
in a system driven by conflicts of interests at every turn, actually benefit
personally while also benefiting shareholders. Thus, in contrast to
corporate directors and officers, journalists experience a convergence of
their self-interest and shareholders’ interests.
I have also indicated some shortcomings of financial journalists,
while comparing them to securities analysts. While I have not
endeavored to reach a conclusion as to which group of professionals can
do more to detect and disclose fraud, I have illustrated ways, both actual
and hypothetical, in which they can cooperate to improve corporate
governance.

